An Empirical Assessment of Users\u27 Information Security Protection Behavior towards Social Engineering Breaches by Patel, Nisha Jatin
Nova Southeastern University 
NSUWorks 
CCE Theses and Dissertations College of Computing and Engineering 
2021 
An Empirical Assessment of Users' Information Security 
Protection Behavior towards Social Engineering Breaches 
Nisha Jatin Patel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons 
Share Feedback About This Item 
This Dissertation is brought to you by the College of Computing and Engineering at NSUWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in CCE Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more 













An Empirical Assessment of Users' Information Security Protection Behavior 


























A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in 
 Information Systems 
 
 
College of Computing and Engineering 
















An Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to Nova Southeastern  
University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
An Empirical Assessment of Users' Information Security Protection Behavior 







User behavior is one of the most significant information security risks. Information Security 
is all about being aware of who and what to trust and behaving accordingly. Due to 
technology becoming an integral part of nearly everything in people's daily lives, the 
organization's need for protection from security threats has continuously increased. Social 
engineering is the act of tricking a user into revealing information or taking action. One of 
the riskiest aspects of social engineering is that it depends mainly upon user errors and is not 
necessarily a technology shortcoming. User behavior should be one of the first apprehensions 
when it comes to social engineering. Unfortunately, there are few specific studies to 
understand factors that affect users' information security protection behavior towards social 
engineering breaches.  
 
The focus of the information security literature is shifting from technology to user behavior 
in recent times. SETA (Security Education Training Awareness) program aids organizations 
in teaching their users about information security issues and expectations to prevent 
information security breaches. Information security policies depict the rules and regulations 
that everyone must follow utilizing an organization's information technology resources. This 
research study used Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) combined with the SETA program 
and security policies to determine factors that affect users' information security protection 
behavior towards social engineering breaches. This research study was an empirical and 
quantitative study to congregate data utilizing a web survey and PLS-SEM (Partial Least 
Squares Structural Equation Modeling) technique. As a result, the research study supported 
all three hypotheses associated with fear, including a positive impact of perceived severity on 
fear, perceived vulnerability on fear, and fear on protection motivation. Moreover, the 
research study substantiated the positive impact of perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, and response efficacy on protection motivation. Furthermore, the research 
study also confirmed the positive impact of protection motivation and the SETA program on 
protection behavior.     
 
The findings of this research study derived that, unswerving with the literature, social 
engineering has arisen as one of the biggest threats in information security. This research 
study explored factors impacting users' information security protection behavior towards 




contribution in view of a lesser-researched fear appeal in preceding research using PMT. This 
research study provided the groundwork for encouraging and nurturing users' information 
security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Finally, this research 
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     Society, organizations, and governments have become increasingly reliant on information 
technology (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2008; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Siponen & 
Vance, 2014). Moreover, information security breaches, a murkier side of information 
technology, are tough to identify, impeach, and become more sophisticated due to technology 
advancements (D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014; Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012; Ifinedo, 2014). As 
the attacking techniques are getting more automated, hacking tools are increasingly available 
free of charge, and besides, skills required to perform attacks are becoming lesser significant 
(Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Straub & 
Welke, 1998).  
Social Engineering 
 
     Scholars have defined social engineering as "the psychological manipulation of people in 
order to gain access to a system for which the attacker is not authorized" (Bhakta & Harris, 
2015, p. 424). Social engineering is a technique used to manipulate users steered by a 
cybercriminal to access confidential information or executing an action to enable a 
cyberattack (Alazri, 2015; Osuagwu & Chukwudebe, 2015). Social engineering (SE) is a 
crucial area of information security. Social Engineering manipulates people to compromise 
information security (Brody, Brizzee, & Cano, 2012; Malfaz & Salichs, 2011; Tetri & 





Dinev & Hu, 2007; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Social engineering attackers begin with the 
target or their associate obtaining specific physical and emotional attributes of a person 
(Heartfield & Loukas, 2015; Mansfield-Devine, 2016; Meguerdichian, Koushanfar, Qu, & 
Potkonjak, 2001). Social engineers target people who have access to systems or other people, 
persuading them into revealing confidential information or influencing them to carry out 
steps for the attacks (Brody et al., 2012; Bullée, Montoya, Pieters, Junger, & Hartel, 2015; 
Heartfield & Loukas, 2015).  
     Information security attacks and information misuse result in significant financial losses 
to users, businesses, government, and organizations (D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; 
Herath & Rao 2009a; Saleem, 1996). Social engineering has emerged as a severe threat due 
to a shortage of visibility about information collected by social engineering attacks combined 
with an exponential increase of risk associated with social engineering (Acquisti, 
Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). A 
social engineering attacker can use the most prominent instrument of manipulating people 
into giving organizational information (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; McCoy, Park, Shi, & 
Jakobsson, 2016; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013).  
     It is possible to execute social engineering on a large scale, and multinational companies 
and government organizations are victims of these attacks (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; 
McCoy et al., 2016). Accordingly, organizations design and implement SETA (Security 
Education Training Awareness) program and security policies for security awareness 
training, ongoing communication of security policies, reminders for changing passwords, 





cognizance in case of a social engineering breach (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; Straub 
& Welke, 1998).  
Protection Behavior 
 
     Every time users interact with technology, there is a possibility of a user error (Boss et al., 
2009; Lebek, Uffen, Neumann, Hohler, & Breitner, 2014; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). 
However, what is thought-provoking is that every user could fall for a social engineering 
attack (Cram, Proudfoot, & D'Arcy, 2017; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Straub, 1990). 
Notwithstanding all technological advances in information security, user behavior plays an 
important part, as most users do not comprehend how to safeguard critical information and 
digital assets (Komatsu, Takagi, & Takemura, 2013; Posey,  Roberts,  Lowry, Bennett, & 
Courtney, 2013; Straub & Welke, 1998). Nonetheless, information security technology alone 
is not sufficient to mitigate information security risks; protection behavior remains a central 
aspect in information security and should not be underestimated (Cram, Proudfoot, & 
D'Arcy, 2017; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Straub & Welke, 1998). 
Problem Statement  
 
     Social engineering attacks defraud executives out of the organization's money and results 
in substantial financial losses for a significant number of organizations (Brody et al., 2012; 
Zweighaft, 2017). Therefore, this study addressed the research problem by identifying factors 
impacting users' information security protection behavior towards social engineering 
breaches. This research study was built on previous research by Hong and Thong (2013) and 
Wolff (2016), who recommended that social engineering risks, threats, features, actions, and 
responses need significant attention. There is an increasing need to protect organizations 





Bullée et al., 2015). At the same time, social engineering breaches continue to increase in 
complexity and impact (Bullée et al., 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).   
     Social engineering breaches can be disastrous for an organization's brand image and 
reputation in the industry (Goode, Hoehle, Venkatesh, & Brown, 2017). Bélanger and 
Crossler (2011) cautioned that organizational resources are reactive to social engineering 
breaches rather than proactive. Even though many social engineering risks result in financial 
losses, organizations are under-secured, the social engineering problem has remained under-
researched and unresolved (Jakobsson, 2016; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Thus, there is an 
imperative need to comprehend and examine countermeasures and means to prevent social 
engineering risks (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012). 
     Social engineers manipulate users into giving information (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, & 
Weippl, 2015; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). Users' usage and a violation of security policies can 
breach security (Benson, Saridakis, & Tennakoon, 2015). Internal user behavior was the 
cause of 34% of security breaches (McCormac, Zwaans, Parsons, Calic, Butavicius, & 
Pattinson, 2017). Technical actions alone are insufficient to safeguard an organization's 
information security (InfoSec); there is a more significant emphasis required on the human 
aspects of InfoSec (McCormac et al., 2017). While users are among the leading causes of 
security breaches, insider threats are not easy to avoid and prevent (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 
2015). Algarni, Xu, and Chan (2017), Bullée et al. (2015), as well as Heartfield and Loukas 
(2015) recommended that users' information security protection behavior towards social 
engineering breaches need additional attention and research.  
     Despite what the prior research studies have explored and resolved, social engineering is 





Numerous studies focused on various aspects of social engineering. Nevertheless, most of 
these studies have not engrossed in users' behavioral responses to the imposed social 
engineering attacks. There was a discrepancy in the existing research on users' beliefs and 
perceptions that impact their behavioral responses to social engineering attacks. Previous 
studies had not explored factors that influence users' information security protection behavior 
towards social engineering breaches.  
     Therefore, it appeared that additional investigation on factors that affect users' information 
security protection behavior towards social engineering breaches was necessary (Algarni et 
al., 2017; Kaushalya et al., 2018). Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, and Polak (2015) proposed 
using fear appeals in the PMT to motivate users and deter information security breaches. 
There was a solid need for further exploration and research on well-formulated SETA 
program and well-aligned security policies for the overall IS (information systems) strategy 
to keep organizational information assets and resources safe from dire attacks (D'Arcy & 
Hovav, 2007; Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003; Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004). There was no 
published research to determine the effects of perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, 
fear, maladaptive rewards, response efficacy, self-efficacy, perceived response costs, SETA 
program, security policies, and protection motivation on users' information security 
protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches using PMT.  
Dissertation Goal 
 
     This research study's main goal was to perform an empirical verification of the factors 
contributing to users' information security protection behavior. This research study developed 
a model that entails the full nomology of Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) combined 





Additionally, this research study developed an integrated SETA program and security 
policies model under the umbrella of PMT theory full nomology (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011). It 
assisted in cumulative theory-building initiatives to improve the information security arena 
and prevent social engineering breaches (Herath & Rao, 2009b).  
     Initially discovered by Rogers (1975), PMT has become a gold standard for health-related 
behavior research, discovery, and exploration. PMT was originally established to elucidate 
the impacts of fear appeals on health motivation and behaviors (Rogers, 1975). PMT shows 
how individuals are inspired to respond to dangerous situations, named fear appeals (Boss et 
al., 2015). PMT describes that individuals use a cognitive process combining threat and 
coping appraisals to interpret and respond to dangerous situations (Boss et al., 2015).  
     PMT was adapted to understand what motivates individuals to adopt security policies 
(Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015) and espouse authentication services (Yang, Zhang, 
& Lanting, 2017). PMT has been utilized to exhibit online privacy protection behavior (Chai, 
Bagchi-Sen, Morrell, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2009) and employ anti-malware software 
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee & Larsen, 2009). 
     There are various enhancements and extensions implemented in the information security 
field over time. PMT has core nomology and full nomology. The PMT core nomology is the 
same as the full nomology, except that core nomology does not include the two constructs, 
fear and maladaptive rewards (Boss et al., 2015). Boss et al. (2015) found that "typically, 
ISec studies omit core PMT concepts or fear-appeal manipulations without explanation" (p. 
9). Boss et al. (2015) argued that the misrepresentation of the PMT presents a substantial 





Our careful review of the foundation for PMT identified three opportunities for 
improving ISec PMT research. First, extant ISec studies do not use the full nomology 
of PMT constructs. Second, only one study uses fear-appeal manipulations, even 
though these are a core element of PMT, and virtually no ISec study models or 
measures fear. Third, whereas these studies have made excellent progress in 
predicting security intentions, none of them have addressed actual security behaviors 
(p. 2). 
     This research study, therefore, utilized the full nomology of PMT to develop its research 
model. It was worthwhile to further investigate the PMT in combination with the SETA 
program and security policies in the context of social engineering. 
Research Model 
 
     PMT is a valuable groundwork for explaining how individuals use a cognitive method to 
decide security behavior to respond to insecure conditions (Boss et al., 2015). It offers a 
comprehensive understanding of why individuals may not execute recommended protective 
behaviors against social engineering threats (Herath & Rao, 2009b). This understanding 
improves educational, training, and awareness resources to respond to social engineering 
breaches (Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008). Although the information security domain utilized 
PMT widely, there was an additional need for empirical research studies performed in social 
engineering (Lee & Larsen, 2009; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). This research model utilized 
PMT in social engineering (Crossler, Johnston, Lowry, Hu, Warkentin, & Baskerville, 2013).         
     Although the extant research studies in the information security area used many PMT 
concepts, most of them did not use the full nomology of PMT (Boss et al., 2015). In the 





(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Extant research studies omitted constructs from the full 
nomology of PMT (Liang & Xue, 2010). Previous research studies omitted constructs such 
as response costs and maladaptive rewards, missing out on utilizing the benefit of full 
nomology of PMT (Alashoor, Han, & Joseph, 2017). This research study utilized the full 
nomology of PMT to incorporate comprehensive analysis and understand the impact of every 
construct (Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000).  
     PMT is logically suitable for information security research where fear inspires users to 
exhibit protection behaviors (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). Fear provocation happens as a 
retort to circumstances adjudicated as unsafe and protective behavior is exhibited to prevent 
it (Rogers 1975). PMT includes fear and provides information about users’ ability to cope 
with the threat in a productive way (Floyd et al., 2000). Neglecting fear from the information 
security research study utilizing PMT could weaken the results; hence, this study included 
fear in the research model (Boss et al., 2015). 
     Many information security research utilizing PMT used protection motivation as the 
research model’s dependent construct (Boss et al., 2015). PMT can predict both protection 
motivation and protection behavior, as reinforced by Sommestad, Karlzén, and Hallberg 
(2015). Extant research studies utilizing PMT in the health area have addressed actual 
behaviors in addition to intentions (Milne et al., 2000). Actual behaviors and intentions need 
to be studied for social engineering because behaviors also need to be improved and not just 
intentions (Boss et al., 2015). This research study went beyond protection motivation and 
incorporated the relationship between protection motivation and protection behavior to 





     To carry out security policy and increase protection behaviors of users, organizations 
implement a comprehensive SETA program (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011; Johnston et al., 2015). 
Nurturing a security culture that inspires robust and well-aligned SETA program and security 
policies should help reduce information misuse and increase protection behavior in the 
workplace (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Herath & Rao 2009b). Therefore, this research model 
analyzed the impacts of SETA program and security policies on protection behavior to 
prevent security engineering breaches. 
     The cognitive mediating method comprises of two distinct processes: the threat appraisal 
process (perceptions of how endangered an individual feels) (Liang & Xue, 2009) and the 
coping appraisal process (perceptions of the recommended coping response to the danger) 
(Floyd et al., 2000). This research study made use of PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 
1975), which propositions that an individual’s perceived vulnerability and the severity will 
influence the level of fear experienced.  
     Fear and rewards will influence the execution of behaviors to protect against danger. 
These factors make the threat appraisal component of the model. Furthermore, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs will influence an individual’s protection 
motivation to perform protection behaviors. These factors make the coping appraisal 
component of the model. The anticipated paybacks of not executing protection behaviors 
against social engineering threats and the expected costs to be experienced by executing 
protection behaviors may negatively influence users’ protection motivation. 
     Threat appraisal in this research model includes fear appeal (how individuals respond to 
unsafe circumstances) (Milne et al., 2000), maladaptive rewards (paybacks from not 





judging the scale of the danger) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983), and perceived vulnerability 
(individual deciding own susceptibility to the danger) (Liang & Xue, 2010). The coping 
appraisal includes response efficacy (the individual's belief in the perceived effectiveness of 
the protective action) (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010), response cost (perceived cost to the 
individual in exhibiting the protection behavior) (Rogers, 1975), and self-efficacy (the 
individual's belief in own capability to exhibit the protection behavior) (Herath & Rao, 
2009b).   
     The research model included eleven constructs that determine the users' information 
security protection behavior towards social engineering breaches. Four of these constructs, 
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear, and maladaptive rewards, made up the user's 
threat appraisal. Response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs made up the user's 
coping appraisal. This research model went beyond the nomological model of the PMT by 
introducing vital precursors SETA program and security policies. The SETA program and 
security policies were two additional constructs utilized in addition to PMT constructs. 






Figure 1: Proposed Research Model 
Research Question 
 
     This research study addressed the following main research question: 
     RQ: What are the factors influencing the users' information security protection behavior    




     In this research study, perceived severity signified the brutality of the social engineering 
breach and the possible losses caused by the organization's breach. PMT accentuates the 
impacts created by persuasive communications to influence people's behavior in a 
determined manner (Rogers, 1975). Similarly, the scope of PMT includes factors that 
influence motivation that, in turn, affect behavior (Rogers, 1975). In this research study, a 
social engineering breach is considered the users' perceived threat. The PMT suggested that 





be more serious, the higher the fear appeal for the danger (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). 
Correspondingly, the more severe the threat to a user is, the more fear the user would enthuse 
(Milne et al., 2000). Boss et al. (2015) noted that there is a positive relationship between 
perceived severity and fear. Therefore, hitherto background and the positive association 
between perceived severity and fear resulted in the following hypothesis: 
H1: Perceived severity is positively associated with fear. 
     In this research study, perceived vulnerability signified users' assessment of whether their 
organization was susceptible to social engineering breaches without following security 
measures. The PMT suggested that perceived vulnerability directly impacted fear (Floyd et 
al., 2000; Marett, McNab, & Harris, 2011). The higher the perception of threat likely to 
happen, the higher the users' emotional response towards the threat (Floyd et al., 2000). Boss 
et al. (2015) noted a positive relationship between perceived vulnerability and fear. 
Consequently, the background up until now and the positive association between perceived 
vulnerability and fear gave rise to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with fear. 
     Fear is a negative emotion that rises from diagnosing threats in social engineering 
breaches (Rogers, 1975). The more significant the threat, the more probable users would be 
motivated to protect themselves from a social engineering breach (Milne et al., 2000). 
Raising fear can result in a user taking additional protection actions (Rogers, 1975). 
Consequently, if users feel that the negative consequences of a given security threat are 






     Users who emphasize controlling dangers of information security risk are more motivated 
to mitigate the origin of the danger. Fear becomes a motivator based on positive coping 
responses (Burns, Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2017). Burns et al. (2017) and Posey, Roberts, 
and Lowry (2015) noted a positive relationship between fear and protection motivation. So, 
hitherto background and the positive association between fear and protection motivation 
brought about the following hypothesis:  
H3: Fear is positively associated with protection motivation. 
     In this research study, perceived severity is social engineering breach's apparent impact. 
According to the PMT, the higher the user's belief that social engineering breaches will cause 
danger, the user is more motivated to adhere to information security compliance (Rogers, 
1975). Past research demonstrated that perceived severity positively influences users' security 
measures (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). Similarly, when a user faced a condition that 
induces fear, the user may find that espousing the necessary measure will resolve the 
situation (Boss et al., 2015). These results are reliable with other research studies that 
demonstrated security concerns positively influence security attitudes, positively affecting 
motivation to follow security measures (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Vance, Siponen, and 
Pahnila (2012) noted a positive relationship between perceived severity and protection 
motivation. Accordingly, the background up until now and the positive association between 
perceived severity and protection motivation led to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Perceived severity is positively associated with protection motivation. 
     In this research study, perceived vulnerability is the likelihood that an unwanted breach 
will occur without following security measures. PMT states that the higher the perception of 





users' belief in their chance of undergoing a threat. Posey et al. (2015) noted a positive 
relationship between perceived vulnerability and protection motivation. Subsequently, the 
context up until now and the positive association between perceived vulnerability and the 
protection motivation directed to the following hypothesis: 
H5: Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with protection motivation. 
     Users exhibit maladaptive responses when they believe that failing to adapt outweighs the 
adaptation (Burns et al., 2017). Saving time is often considered a maladaptive reward in prior 
information security compliance research (Vance et al., 2012). Youn (2009) substantiated 
that the higher the maladaptive rewards lower the protection motivation. Both Burns et al. 
(2017) and Boss et al. (2015) noted a negative relationship between maladaptive rewards and 
protection motivation. So, hitherto background and the negative association between 
perceived maladaptive rewards and protection motivation brought about the following 
hypothesis: 
H6: Maladaptive rewards are negatively associated with protection motivation. 
     In this research study, response efficacy signified users' confidence that specific behaviors 
would allow them to prevent social engineering breaches. Users' perceptions of an 
anticipated response's efficacy motivate them to exhibit desired behavior (Bandura, 1977). 
Jayanti and Burns (1998) discovered outcome benefits to play a substantial part in the 
motivation to perform the expected actions. Therefore, if users distinguish that a 
recommended security measure is easy to exhibit but expects the results of using such 






     Kumar, Park, and Subramaniam (2008) found that response efficacy positively correlates 
with executives' motivation to adopt security countermeasures. Johnston and Warkentin 
(2010) noted a positive relationship between response efficacy and protection motivation. 
Consequently, hitherto background and the positive association between response efficacy 
and protection motivation brought about the following hypothesis: 
H7: Response efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation. 
     In this research study, self-efficacy referred to users' belief that they can efficaciously 
fulfill information security policies, preventing social engineering breaches. Bandura (1977) 
initially perceived the notion of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy underscores users' judgment of 
their capabilities to adhere to information security policies (Bandura, 1977). Likewise, self-
efficacy was positively related to motivation for behaviors (Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & 
Howells, 1980). Self-efficacy beliefs result in protection motivation towards information 
security policies (Boss et al., 2015). Johnston and Warkentin (2010) noted that there is a 
positive relationship between self-efficacy and protection motivation. Thus, background up 
until now and the positive association between self-efficacy and protection motivation 
directed the following hypothesis: 
H8: Self-efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation. 
     PMT theorizes that as the response cost increases, the prospect of exhibiting the adaptive 
coping response decreases. Prior IS research has found support in this matter. Kumar et al. 
(2008) validated that the executive's security compliance motivation lowered when response 
cost increased. In this research study, response cost included the inconvenience incurred in 





Furthermore, response cost is associated with apprehensions about how much it would cost to 
perform the recommended protection response (Milne et al., 2000).  
     Response cost includes financial costs, the cognitive effort associated with a protective 
countermeasure, the time required to implement the protection behaviors, expense, 
inconvenience, difficulty, side effects, lost business, or opportunity cost (Burns et al., 2017).      
The higher the response cost, the less motivated a user is to perform a behavior to protect 
from social engineering breaches (Burns et al., 2017). Vance et al. (2012) noted a negative 
relationship between response cost and protection motivation. So, hitherto context and the 
negative association between response efficacy and protection motivation led to the 
following hypothesis: 
H9: Response cost is negatively associated with protection motivation. 
     Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003) noted that intentions are good predictors for 
the actual behavior, which, in the context of this research study, is users' information security 
protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. The intention to follow 
information security procedures leads to compliance with information security (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). In addition, users' intention to exhibit the behavior of their interest determines 
their actual behavior (Dinev & Hu, 2007). Intentions may capture the motivation that 
stimulus a behavior, showing how hard users will perform a specific behavior (Ajzen, 1991). 
Therefore, context up until now and the positive association between protection motivation 
and protection behavior gave rise to the following hypothesis: 
H10: Protection motivation is positively associated with protection behavior. 
     The SETA program strengthens adequate security guidelines and accentuates a breach's 





al., 2009; Posey et al., 2015). In addition, the greater the SETA program, the more motivated 
a user is to perform a behavior to protect from social engineering breaches (D'Arcy & Hovav, 
2007; Posey et al., 2015; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Subsequently, hitherto background 
and the positive association between SETA program and protection motivation resulted in the 
following hypothesis: 
H11: SETA program is positively associated with protection behavior. 
     Security policies cover rules, procedures, and guidelines for the appropriate and 
inappropriate usage of information assets, resources, and systems, as well as penalties for 
improper usage (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Kankanhalli et al., 2003). Furthermore, security policies 
provide rules to the users regarding what to do and what not to do (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011; 
Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2018; Straub & Welke, 1998). Due to its detailed guidelines, a 
more advanced security policy results in higher user protection behavior (D'Arcy et al., 2009; 
Lee et al., 2004). Therefore, the greater the security policies, the more protection behavior 
users will exhibit toward social engineering breaches (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Herath & Rao 
2009b). Accordingly, background up until now and the positive association between security 
policies and protection motivation brought about the following hypothesis: 
H12: Security policies are positively associated with protection behavior. 











Summary of Constructs used 
Constructs Definition References 
Perceived 
severity 
How serious the users believe that the social 
engineering breach would be to themselves 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Floyd et al., 2000 
Perceived 
vulnerability 
How personally susceptible a user feels to the 
apparent social engineering threat 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Floyd et al., 2000 
Fear A negative emotion representing a response that 
arises from recognizing social engineering danger 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Posey et al., 2015 
Maladaptive 
rewards 
Purposefully avoiding a danger-control response 
in response to social engineering fear appeal and 
choosing a behavior that is not protective against 
the social engineering danger raised in the fear 
appeal 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Burns et al., 2017 
Response 
efficacy 
The belief that the adaptive response will work 
and taking the protection action will help protect 
the self or others from social engineering breach 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010 
Self-efficacy The perceived ability of the individual to carry 
out the adaptive response for social engineering 
breach 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010 
Response Cost Any costs associated with taking the adaptive 
coping response for social engineering breach 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Vance et al., 2012 
SETA Program SETA (Security Education Training Awareness) 
program aims to reduce the organization's 
security risk and increase the ability to prevent 
social engineering breaches 
Posey et al., 2015 
Security Policies Security policies provide comprehensive 
direction to users regarding acceptable use of 
organizational information assets and resources 




One's intentions to protect oneself from the social 
engineering breach 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010; 
Vance et al., 2012 
Protection 
Behavior 
Purposefully choosing a danger-control response 
in response to a social engineering threat and 
choosing a behavior that protects against the 
social engineering breach 
Boss et al., 2015; 
Dinev & Hu,  2007; 






Relevance and Significance 
 
     Technology on its own is inadequate in the arena of information security, and researchers 
have started focusing on the human side of security (Goel, Williams, & Dincelli, 2017; Liang 
& Xue, 2010; Wang, Li, & Rao, 2016). "Knowledge about user security behaviors is far from 
complete" (Warkentin & Willison, 2009, p. 395). Understanding the factors that influence 
users' information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches is vital 
for any organization (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Kaushalya et al., 2018; 
Krombholz et al., 2015).  
     Algarni et al. (2017) and Tetri and Vuorinen (2013) recognized the lack of research 
involving social engineering and the need to understand crucial factors influencing users' 
information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Therefore, a 
complete and comprehensive overview was necessary to uncover factors influencing users' 
protection motivation and behavior to prevent social engineering breaches (Bullée et al., 
2015).  
Barriers and Issues 
 
     One of the barriers that might be possible for the survey questionnaire was that 
participants might have been hesitant to provide undesirable responses in terms of 
information security policies and standards. Information security expectations are prevalent 
in most organizations, resulting in this research study's probable under-reporting of unwanted 
behavior. Consequently, participants of this research study might have felt the possibility of 
their employer finding their opinions about information security-related items. Therefore, to 
mitigate this barrier, the survey questionnaire did not seek personal or employment details 





     This research's primary contribution is by incorporating the SETA program and security 
policies into the PMT full nomology research model to perform an empirical assessment of 
users' information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Social 
engineering should be explored further in future research to provide additional insight into 
this vital topic. There could be additional constructs that may provide other perceptions into 
the information security behavior of individual users to prevent social engineering breaches.      
     Another barrier of this research study is the thought process for PMT itself. PMT is 
grounded mainly on fear. It assumes that individuals retort to fear by protecting themselves. 
There could be other factors in play that impacts users' behavior which PMT does not 
consider. Future research should study users who fail in securely conducting themselves and 
explore the reasons behind it.      




     Assumptions included that the participants would be comfortable sharing their honest 
opinion while answering the survey. Similarly, participants provided precise answers to the 
survey questions, a crucial element regarding a sensitive topic like their organizations' 
information security (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013).  
Limitations 
 
     Limitations impact the research results, and researchers cannot control the limitations 
(Creswell, 2005). The Hawthorne effect describes the pre-disposition in which participants 
change their answers because they are observed (Olson, Verley, Santos, & Salas, 2004). The 





their organizational behavior and responded with the information closer to the desired 
behaviors (Hagen & Albechtsen, 2009). 
Delimitations 
 
     Delimitation refers to explaining the boundaries set and the study's scope (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2013). A delimitation of this research study was that all the samples belonged to 
only one country, the United States of America (U.S.A.). The results of this research study 
might have differed in the other countries. 
Definition of Terms 
 
     The following section shows vital terms and their related definitions in the context of this 
research study. 
Information security – Protects information from a comprehensive array of threats to 
safeguard business continuity, curtail business risk, and capitalize on business opportunities 
and return investments (ISO/IEC, 2005). 
Information system risk – Any financial loss or disruption of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (CIA) of information systems caused by a malicious cyber-attack (Fielder, 
Panaousis, Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi, 2016; Rees, Deane, Rakes, & Baker, 2011). 
Social engineering – A practice of using people skills and persuasion techniques to attain 
unauthorized information is called social engineering (Jakobsson, 2016). 
SETA program – A formal process to increase awareness and motivation through ongoing 
training and education, remind users about the security guidelines to protect from the security 






Security policy – "a statement of the roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard 
the information and technology resources of their organizations" (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010, p. 526-527). 
Protection motivation theory – A theory to elucidate how individuals change their attitudes 
and actions, cope with the situation, and make decisions when facing danger (Rogers, 1975). 
Threat appraisal – An element of PMT to evaluate the perceived threat level in a specific 
situation (Floyd et al., 2000). 
Coping appraisal – An element of PMT that evaluates several factors that are likely to 
warrant an individual to engage in a suggested preventive response (Floyd et al., 2000). 
Perceived severity – A degree to which a user perceives that adverse results, including 
physical and psychological damage caused by a social engineering breach, will be severe 
(Liang & Xue, 2010). 
Perceived vulnerability – A perception of the probability of experiencing adverse results 
from a social engineering breach (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). 
Maladaptive rewards – An expected benefit to be gained for not exhibiting protection 
behavior of complying with information security measures to prevent social engineering 
breaches (Boss et al., 2015).  
Response efficacy – A user's belief that an adaptive response (a recommended behavior) will 
help mitigate social engineering breaches (Workman et al., 2008; Yoon, Hwang, & Kim, 
2012). 
Self-efficacy – User's beliefs in their ability to perform adaptive response against a social 





Response costs – Users' perceived downsides for indulging in protection behavior (Posey et 
al., 2015). 
Fear – A user's negative emotional response to danger (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 
2015). 
Protection motivation – An intention to execute protection behaviors against security 
breaches (Floyd et al., 2000). 
Protection behavior – An actual execution of protective behaviors against security breaches 
(Floyd et al., 2000). 
PLS-SEM – A structural equation modeling technique develops exploratory research 
theories to comprehend multifaceted cause-effect relationship models with latent variables 
(Hair, Risher, Sarstedt, & Ringle, 2019). 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
     The following section comprises acronyms utilized throughout this research study. 
IT – Information Technology 
SE – Social Engineering 
CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
SETA – Security Education Training Awareness 
PMT – Protection Motivation Theory 
PS – Perceived Severity 
PV – Perceived Vulnerability 
FE – Fear 





RE – Response Efficacy 
SE – Self-efficacy 
RC – Response Cost 
ST – SETA Program 
SP – Security Policies 
PM – Protection Motivation 
PB – Protection Behavior 
PLS-SEM – Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
IRB – Institutional Review Board  
Summary 
 
     Chapter one of this research study included background, problem statement, dissertation 
goal, research model, research question, and hypotheses. It contained relevance and 
significance, barriers and issues, assumptions, limitations, delimitations, the definition of 
terms, and a list of acronyms. Chapter one set the tone of this research study by stating the 
main problem, framework, and significance. Chapter two of this research study contains a 
literature review to help as the groundwork and reasoning for the research problem, research 
questions, hypotheses, and methodology. It delivers information about the current state of 
research on the selected topic. Likewise, it synthesizes prior research, integrates the 















     This chapter contains an analysis of the literature regarding the research question raised 
by this research study (Paré, Trudel, Jaana, & Kitsiou, 2015). In addition, it synthesizes 
research about information security and social engineering, and it commences with a brief 
overview of information security, social engineering, the SETA program, and security 
policies. A subsequent discussion about protection motivation theory and its constructs 
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear, maladaptive rewards, response efficacy, 
self-efficacy, response cost, protection motivation, and protection behavior follows. Finally, 
this chapter includes the gaps in PMT and information systems literature.  
Information Security 
 
     Warkentin and Willison (2009) stated that the most significant threats are insider threats 
from organizational users who are 'trusted agents.' Despite the technology solutions, 
understanding why users fall for information security breaches and expose personally 
identifiable information (PII) needed much research attention (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Liang & 
Xue, 2010; Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, an emerging research stream on the human 
standpoint of information security emphasized user protection behaviors and the factors that 
motivate users to exhibit the protection behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Goel et al., 2017; 
Liang & Xue, 2010).   
    Irrespective of the right technology implemented to protect organizational information 





clicking on dangerous links, and accessing unprotected networks (Das & Khan, 2016; Jensen, 
Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher, 2017; Menard, Bott, & Crossler, 2017). In other words, social 
engineering breaches are often not the result of technology failure, but because users ignore 
or override security measures (Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs, & Komanduri, 2011; Menard et 
al., 2017). The reasons for this problem were uncertain and necessitated additional research. 
Therefore, the research study described in this thesis investigated why users do not perform 
protection behaviors against social engineering breaches. 
Social Engineering 
 
     Social engineering breaches remained an ongoing risk that allows hackers to evade 
security measures and pose a significant risk (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Goel 
et al., 2017). For example, Heartfield and Loukas (2015) researched semantic attacks, one of 
the many social engineering attacks. Junger, Montoya, and Overink (2017) measured 
disclosure by asking sensitive information subjecting to increase social engineering risk. 
Furthermore, Algarni et al. (2017) explored Facebook users' susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization.    
     Moreover, Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009) found insufficient existing information 
security and privacy protection techniques. Mouton, Leenen, and Venter (2016) combined 
social engineering attack templates with real-world examples. In addition, Bullée et al. 
(2015) found that increasing awareness about the countermeasures associated with social 
engineering demonstrated a substantial helpful effect on neutralizing the attack.  
     Organizations and institutions suffer from social engineering attacks (Abraham & 
Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009). As 
technology increases in sophistication, deceitful attackers target users rather than users' 





danger to organizational security is not a technical glitch or inefficient system; it is a user 
(Algarni et al., 2017; Anderson & Agarwal, 2010, 2011). In this unprecedented era of online 
invention, users may spontaneously give away sensitive information without understanding 
security repercussions (D'Arcy & Lowry, 2019; Goel & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Krombholz 
et al., 2015).  
    Many users overlook the warnings generated by the technology and tools to prevent social 
engineering breaches for various motives (Goel et al., 2017; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012; Luga, 
Nurse, & Erola, 2016). As a result, social engineering traps gullible users intentionally into 
conveying their confidential data, thus providing open access to an organization's 
fundamental assets, circumventing all the layers of organizational policies and systems 
(Brody et al., 2012; Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012). Furthermore, some social engineering is 
involved in most information security attacks (Bullée et al., 2015; Tu, Turel, Yuan, & 
Archer, 2015).  
     Social engineering has become an ever-increasing threat impacting multinational 
organizations, governments, and individuals (Williams, Hinds, & Joinson, 2018). Social 
engineering is the most popular technique among hackers because it can break even the 
utmost protected systems (Krombholz et al., 2015). Also, the users themselves are the 
weakest part of the information security system, and it is more natural to exploit users' 
weaknesses than exploit technology loopholes (Liang, Xue, Pinsonneault, & Wu, 2019).  
Moreover, social engineers have fully automated attacks and orchestrated them on a colossal 
scale (Krombholz et al., 2015).  
     Social engineers carry attacks over various channels, including email, telephone, websites, 





al., 2015). There are numerous types of social engineering outbreaks like phishing, spear 
phishing, dumpster diving, shoulder surfing, reverse social engineering, waterhole attacks, 
advanced persistent threat, and baiting (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Krombholz et al., 2015).  
     Phishing is a practice of trying to gather confidential information using deceptive 
mechanisms like e-mails, phones, text messages, and websites (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; 
Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007). In addition, spear phishing is a practice of targeting a 
specific individual, organization, or business to gather confidential information using 
deceptive mechanisms like e-mails, phones, text messages, and websites (Chaudhry, 
Chaudhry, & Rittenhouse, 2016). The difference between phishing and spear-phishing is that 
the phishing campaigns do not target victims individually, unlike spear phishing (Chaudhry 
et al., 2016). Moreover, dumpster diving retrieves information from the documents from 
rubbish (Krombholz et al., 2015; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013).  
     Shoulder surfing is a practice of gaining information by making secret, direct observations 
like watching a user's keystrokes while using a computer (Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). On the 
other hand, reverse social engineering is a practice where an attacker gains the victim's trust 
by offering help (Krombholz et al., 2015). A waterhole attack is a practice where an attacker 
infects the websites often visited by the target victims at the waterhole (Fan, Lwakatare, & 
Rong 2017). An advanced persistent threat is a practice where an attacker uses continuous 
and concealed methods to gain access to information, steal data, or surveil systems of the 
victim's organization and remain inside for a long time (Fan et al., 2017).  
     Baiting is a practice where an attacker exploits the victims' greediness and inquisitiveness 
by luring them into a trap of something like a gift kept somewhere and can be received by the 





elicitation, vishing is a practice where an attacker uses social engineering to assess 
vulnerabilities and call victims to lure them into conceding confidential information (Fan et 
al., 2017). Pretexting is a practice where an attacker uses a fabricated scenario and a false 
motive to obtain confidential data using methods like namedropping, impersonation, and 
untruthful identity (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Fan et al., 2017).  
     Tailgating, also known as piggybacking, is a practice where an attacker seeks access to 
the restricted area by following the victim's authorized access (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Fan 
et al., 2017). Quid pro quo is a practice where an attacker presents a technical service in 
exchange for information; for example, the attacker mimics a vendor representative and 
offers to help a victim who needs technical assistance (Conteh & Schmick, 2016).  
SETA Program 
 
     Information security leaders implement information security measures, including security 
education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs to improve the security protection 
behavior of users (Johnston et al., 2015). Thus, SETA programs emphasize raising users' 
awareness of their responsibilities related to organizational information assets and resources, 
the penalties of misusing them, and providing training and education to build these 
capabilities (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Johnston et al., 2015). Efficacious SETA programs 
should result in augmented mindfulness of protection behaviors by making users recognize 
security risks concerning their interactions with information resources and mitigate them by 
refining their acts (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston et al., 2015).   
    Users who had better abilities to detect the social engineering breach are the ones who did 
better in refusing to provide access to the organizational information assets (Parsons, 





knowledgeable users about social engineering emails and the relevant repercussions did 
better in responding to the emails than ill-knowledgeable (Jansson & von Solms, 2013; 
Parsons et al., 2015; Stajano & Wilson, 2011). Accordingly, the goal of the SETA program is 
to inspire users to focus increasingly on a proactive approach instead of a reactive approach 
(Straub & Welke, 1998; Vance et al., 2012).  
Security Policies 
 
     Security policies are statements of organizational goals, controls, procedures, rules, and 
users' responsibilities to prevent social engineering breaches (Lee & Lee, 2002). The details 
and complexity of security policies differ from industry to industry (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
Specifically, the financial services industry may have more stringent security policies than 
hospitality (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
 
    PMT, developed in 1975 by Rogers, utilizes the cognitive process that users undergo when 
they experience danger and respond accordingly (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975). 
Furthermore, it was initially developed based on the expectancy-value theory to 
comprehensively understand the impact of fear appeals on attitude (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Rogers, 1975). Moreover, PMT underwent two meta-analyses (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et 
al., 2000). PMT originated in the health science and psychology field, primarily known for 
motivating people to practice healthy behavior (Posey et al., 2015). PMT is now widely 
recognized as a framework to study protection motivation against any threat (Posey et al., 
2015).  
    PMT provides an efficient theoretical foundation for analyzing how users determine what 





appraisal processes transpiring as an effect of a fear appeal: threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). The two kinds of coping appraisal are adaptive coping 
(to protect) and maladaptive coping (not to protect) (Floyd et al., 2000). PMT theorizes that 
threat appraisal determines factors for a user to adopt a specified coping response (Floyd et 
al., 2000). Posey et al. (2015) summarized threat appraisal and coping appraisal succinctly: 
Threat appraisal is the process by which insiders analyze (1) their perceived 
vulnerability, (2) their perceived severity, and (3) potential intrinsic or extrinsic 
rewards for engaging in maladaptive responses. Coping appraisal is the process by 
which insiders evaluate (1) the efficacy of the potential adaptive responses to a threat 
or response efficacy; (2) their ability to successfully carry out the recommended 
responses, or self-efficacy; and (3) the perceived response costs associated with their 
engagement in the adaptive coping strategy (p. 6-7). 
     The threat appraisal procedure encompasses the users' perception determination about 
vulnerability to an information security threat (perceived vulnerability), the brutality of the 
threat (perceived severity), the terror of the threat (fear) (Boss et al., 2015), as well as any 
intrinsic or extrinsic inspiration for exhibiting an unwanted behavior (maladaptive rewards) 
(Vance et al., 2012). The coping appraisal procedure encompasses the users determining 
whether protection action is efficient at protecting from the threat (response efficacy), 
whether they are capable of executing the protection action (self-efficacy) and if it justifies 
the perceived cost of the action (response cost) (Floyd et al., 2000). Furthermore, response 
efficacy is the user's belief that complying with the organization's information security 





user's confidence to adhere to the organization's information security measures (Bandura, 
1977).       
Perceived Severity  
 
     Perceived severity is a users' valuation of the severity of the significances caused by a 
social engineering breach (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Liang and Xue (2010) and Mohamed and 
Ahmad (2012) appeared to have found a positive relationship between perceived severity and 
protection behavior. Prior literature, such as Hanus and Wu (2016) and Youn (2005), did not 
associate perceived severity and protection behavior. Zahedi, Abbasi, and Chen (2015) found 
perceived severity as a foremost forecaster for protection motivation. In contrast, LaRose and 
Eastin (2004) and Lee et al. (2008) did not find a significant relationship between perceived 
severity and protection motivation. 
Perceived Vulnerability 
 
     If users perceive they are susceptible to a social engineering breach, they are more likely 
to follow information security measures (Workman et al., 2008). Liang and Xue (2010), 
Mohamed and Ahmad (2012), as well as Ng et al. (2009) appeared to have found a weak 
positive relationship between perceived vulnerability and protection behavior. Additionally, 
prior literature such as Hanus and Wu (2016) and Youn (2005) did not find any positive 
relation between perceived vulnerability and protection behavior.  
Fear  
 
     Information security scholars are seemingly attuned to utilize fear which motivates users 
to abide by suggested security protection behaviors (Herath & Rao, 2009a; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010). Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon (2018) studied fear regarding guideline 
usage for secure password creation. In conjunction with perceived severity and perceived 





frequently a user's emotional response to a threat (Rosenstock, 1974; Witte, 1994). Fear may 
comprise anxiety, uneasiness, shock, provocation, worry, or distress (Boss et al., 2015; 
Rosenstock, 1966). "Fear appeals are a necessary component of a holistic security 
management program because threats to information assets are prevalent and must be warned 
against" (Johnston et al., 2015, p. 117).   
Maladaptive Rewards 
 
     If users perceive that the reward for not exhibiting protection motivation is higher than 
exhibiting it, they will be less likely to exhibit it (Vance et al., 2012). Rewards increase the 
likelihood of choosing the maladaptive behavior (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Floyd et al., 
2000). Maladaptive rewards are paybacks from following protection measures and, therefore, can 
be perceived in the form of time-saving, cost-saving, efficiency, pleasure, or even damage (Boss 
et al., 2015; Floyd et al., 2000; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). 
Response Efficacy 
 
     Response efficacy is the degree to which a user believes that a specific action prevents a 
social engineering breach (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Jayanti & Burns, 1998; Venkatesh et 
al., 2003). If a user believes that a specific task will secure organizational information assets, 
the user will be more motivated to comply (Meso, Ding, & Xu, 2013). Response efficacy 
measures the user's belief in the efficacy of security measures in addition to self-efficacy 
(Johnston et al., 2015). The perceived efficiency of security measures positively inclined the 
security measure to not download unknown files and not click on unknown links to prevent 
social engineering breaches (Lai et al., 2012).    
     Response efficacy appeared to have found positively associated with authentication 
service (Yang et al., 2017), acceptance of spyware protection (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010), 





such as Gurung, Luo, and Liao (2009), Hanus and Wu (2016), Hu and Dinev (2005), Liang 
and Xue (2010), as well as Yoon et al. (2012), found a positive relation between response 
efficacy and protection behavior. Nonetheless, Mohamed and Ahmad (2012) appeared to 
have found no positive connection between response efficacy and protection behavior. 
Self-efficacy 
 
     Self-efficacy of noticing information security breaches may reduce one's chance of being 
breached (Wang et al., 2016). PMT introduced self-efficacy by adopting the social cognitive 
theory of Bandura (1977). Furthermore, highly self-efficacious users will be more likely to 
exhibit protection behavior by engaging in protection actions and avoiding high-risk 
activities such as sharing passwords and clicking on unknown links (Hu & Dinev, 2005; 
Milne, Labrecque, & Cromer, 2009). Self-efficacy involved former research investigating 
counterfeit website detectors (Zahedi et al., 2015) and online safety protection behaviors (Lee 
et al., 2008). Prior literature, such as Hanus and Wu (2016) and Yoon et al. (2012), found a 
positive relationship between self-efficacy and protection behavior. On the other hand, Tsai, 
Jiang, Alhabash, LaRose, Rifon, and Cotton (2016) found a negative relation between self-
efficacy and protection motivation. 
Response Cost 
 
     Response cost can be any delay, obstacle, side effect, or disadvantage that users believe 
they will incur if they exhibit protection behavior (Posey et al., 2015). The adoption of 
protection behavior may involve some reluctance for the users to espouse. For instance, if a 
user observes a high response cost for complying with the security measure, the probability 
of non-compliance is also high (Meso et al., 2013). Similarly, response costs decrease the 





     Researchers have found that the perceived response cost discourages users from 
exhibiting protection behavior (Arachchilage & Love, 2013; Boss et al., 2015; Taneja, 
Vitrano, & Gengo, 2014; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Prior literature, such as Liang and Xue 
(2010), and Yoon et al. (2012), found a negative relation between response cost and 
protection behavior. Mohamed and Ahmad (2012) and Ng et al. (2009) appeared to have 
found no link between response cost and protection behavior. 
Protection Motivation 
 
     Protection motivation intends to perform protection behaviors against a social engineering 
threat (Lee, Lim, Kim, Zo, & Ciganek, 2013; Sommestad et al., 2015). Technical and social-
organizational aspects are central to the success of information security (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007). Subsequently, protection motivation for information security 
breaches has emerged as a crucial socio-technical factor (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Liang & Xue, 
2010; Wang et al., 2016). The prior research for protection motivation included the intention 
not to disclose personal information (Beldad, van der Geest, de Jong, & Steehouder, 2012) 
and intention to comply with IT security policies (Crossler, Long, Loraas, & Trinkle, 2014). 
Protection Behavior 
 
     Protection behavior is the actual performance of protection actions against social 
engineering threats (Arachchilage & Love, 2014). Specifically, prior research encompassed 
analysis of protection behavior concerning phishing, a type of social engineering (Arachchilage 
& Love, 2013, 2014). Understanding users' protection behavior to prevent social engineering 
breaches is vital for organizations (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Bullée et al., 2015; Chai et al., 
2009). Similarly, Liang and Xue (2010) stated that research about users' information security 





examined individual users' security behavior, the findings are largely inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory" (p. 404). 
Utilization PMT and Information Systems Literature 
 
     PMT postulates that when users experience a threat, they undergo cognitive threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal processes. A user accesses threat and corresponding coping 
mechanisms and determines to perform adaptive or maladaptive behaviors. These adaptive 
behaviors intend to protect the user against danger, while maladaptive responses prevent the 
desired behavior. 
    PMT is an exceedingly pertinent theory in information security research due to the 
tangible threat-response pairs commonly found in information security. PMT is a well-
researched theory to explore privacy concerns over social network sites (Alashoor et al., 
2017; Mohamed & Ahmad, 2012), intention for antispyware software usage (Gurung et al., 
2009), and online protection actions (Chen & Zahedi, 2016).     
     PMT has been used to research online shopping protection behavior (Milne et al., 2009), 
online protection behavior (Lee et al., 2008), online unsafety behavior (Chou & Chou, 2016), 
and secure email behavior (Ng et al., 2009). Similarly, PMT has been used to discover what 
motivates users to comply with security measures like data backup (Lee & Kozar, 2005; 
Menard, Gatlin, & Warkentin, 2014).  
    PMT is well-utilized to research protection behavior of securing desktops (Hanus & Wu, 
2016), online safety behaviors (Tsai et al., 2016), and adoption of security behaviors 
(Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, & Cotton, 2015). For example, Lee and Larsen (2009) 
used PMT to discover what motivates users to comply with security measures like anti-





investigate compliance with information security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Ifinedo, 
2012; Johnston et al., 2015; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010) and unified security 
practices (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014). 
     Crossler et al. (2013) explored PMT and behavioral InfoSec areas, including insider 
deviant behavior versus insider misbehavior, security compliance, and data collection and 
measurement. Similarly, Workman et al. (2008) examined a research model to determine 
why users would not exhibit protection behavior and why they would choose not to protect 
themselves, even if they believed in the self's ability to defend. 
     PMT has been used to explore malware avoidance behavior (Dang-Pham & 
Pittayachawan, 2015), adoption of antivirus software, and strong passwords (Meso et al., 
2013; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), and coping behaviors to fight identity theft (Lai et al., 
2012). Additionally, PMT is well-served to discover the intention to practice safe computing 
at home (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010) and intentions and behaviors to use antispyware 
(Liang & Xue, 2010).  
     PMT has been used to explore protection behavior against online harassment (Lwin, Li, & 
Ang, 2012) and online safety behaviors (Yoon et al., 2012).  For example, Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) utilized PMT by studying the threat-response pair where users experienced 
the spyware threats and, at the same time, were given an antispyware mechanism to protect 
themselves. Thus, PMT has been utilized and verified as the leading theory in many studies 
related to information security in organizations (Boss et al., 2015; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Liang 







Gaps in PMT and Information Systems Literature 
 
     Information security research routinely dropped proven PMT constructs instead of 
utilizing the PMT full nomology (Boss et al., 2015). Anderson and Agarwal (2010), Chou 
and Chou (2016), Herath and Rao (2009a), Johnston and Warkentin (2010), as well as, 
Kumar et al. (2008) focused on the adaptive coping response of PMT instead of including a 
maladaptive coping portion of PMT in their research. Adaptive behavior is the behavior that 
users exhibit to avert the threat from revealing itself (Chen & Zahedi, 2016). On the contrary, 
maladaptive coping is the users' choice not to comply with a security measure to protect from 
the security breach (Boss et al., 2015).  
     The review of the literature exposed that most of the information systems research 
involving PMT utilized only part of PMT instead of using the full model (Crossler & 
Bélanger, 2014; Ifinedo, 2012; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; Workman 
et al., 2008). PMT is a cognitive process with fear appeal as the central factor determining 
how it impacts attitude and behavior (Milne et al., 2000; Rogers, 1975). Even though the 
relationship between fear and protection motivation seems so natural and fear is one of the 
most significant constructs of PMT, extant information security research has dropped fear 
construct from the PMT research model most of the time (Floyd et al. 2000; Rogers 1975). 
Fear is the most significant factor in the adaptive coping process of PMT. Nonetheless, much 
information systems research involving PMT did not include fear (Chou & Chou, 2016; 
Hanus & Wu, 2016; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Tsai et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017).  
     Again and again, information systems research involving PMT did not include response 
cost (Boehmer et al., 2015; Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Johnston et al., 2015; Mohamed & 





include perceived severity (Alashoor et al., 2017). Some information systems research 
involving PMT did not contain perceived vulnerability (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Some 
information systems research involving PMT did not include response efficacy (Youn, 2005). 
On top of that, some information systems research involving PMT did not comprise self-
efficacy (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Most of the extant research explored protection 
motivation and did not include behavior (Posey et al., 2015). 
     This literature overview highlighted predominantly significant existing gaps. It 
demonstrated that the effects of PMT on protection motivation and behavior to prevent social 
engineering breaches are still not well recognized or dependable in literature. Though PMT is 
well-accepted to discover new information security models (Moody et al., 2018), PMT's full 
research model has not been accurately used to study users' behavior to prevent social 
engineering breaches.  
     There was a lack of literature utilizing PMT combined with the SETA program and 
security policies to explore factors affecting users' information security protection behavior 
to prevent social engineering breaches. This research study was exploratory. Based on the 
gaps in existing literature, this research study discovered factors affecting users' information 




     The multidisciplinary nature of the problem in this research study required a thorough 
literature review. Despite the research steered in social engineering, other studies have failed 
to solve the problem, and social engineering seems to be still a problem. An assessment of 





has been utilized in the information security field to study protection motivation and 
protection behaviors.  
     Previous research did not use the combination of the PMT full nomology, the SETA 
program, and security policies to explain social engineering protection behavior. An in-depth 
literature review resulted in the necessary information for an empirical assessment of users' 
information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches leveraging 
protection motivation theory, the SETA program, and security policies. Chapter two 
concluded the literature review. 
     The next chapter of this research study contains information about methodology. It 
includes an overview of the research design to answer the research questions and test the 
hypotheses. It encompasses instrument development and validation, and measurement items 
for the constructs. Furthermore, it contains instrument reliability and validity, internal 
consistency reliability, construct validity, content validity, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity. It comprises details of the proposed sample, sample population, and 
anticipated response rate. It presents a plan for data analysis, formats for demonstrating 















     This research study explored the role threat appraisal (perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, fear, and maladaptive rewards), coping appraisal (response efficacy, self-
efficacy, and response costs), SETA program, and security policies have with the users' 
information security protection motivation and protection behavior to prevent social 
engineering breaches. Data Science is an overarching term for methodologies to gather 
insights from data. Quantitative analysis is the procedure of collecting and analyzing 
quantifiable and provable data to gain intuition. This research study is quantitative and 
utilized formerly established survey instruments for both the dependent and independent 
variables. Web survey administration provided statistical analysis input. A seven-point Likert 
scale measured constructs. Participant’s demographics and background information were 
collected, followed by a validity and reliability assessment of the response data. 
     The Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling, known as PLS-SEM, is used to 
model and estimate the cause-effects relationship model. PLS-SEM is suitable for 
exploratory research by identifying the variance in the dependent variables when verifying 
proposed theoretical models (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2017). Data results assisted in 
hypotheses validation. The data results are summarized, followed by the conclusion.  
Research Design Overview 
 
     The research method was quantitative research comprised of data collection, analysis, 





research method included web-based survey research to test the research model empirically. 
The research study utilized the positivism research philosophy to derive measurable 
observations that result in statistical evaluations, ensuring that research results are observable 
and quantifiable.  
      The research study was a cross-sectional type where the study measured a cross-section 
of a given population at one precise instant in time. The unit of analysis was the primary 
entity that the intended research study was planning to analyze. Furthermore, the unit of 
analysis of this research study was individual users, as it was the most appropriate choice 
based on the research plan of the study. The research study tested all the items in the context 
of users’ information security protection behavior towards social engineering breaches.   
Research Methodology 
 
Human Ethical Attention 
 
     Prior approval by the Nova Southeastern University institutional review board (IRB) was 
a prerequisite to conducting this research study. So, the survey of this research study went 
through an IRB process. The research study was not hostile, devious, daunting, or traumatic 
to the participants and guaranteed participants that their identity would be kept completely 
anonymous, and their responses will be strictly utilized only for this research study (Gall, 
Borg, & Gall, 1996).  
Delphi Method Study 
 
     A panel of three SMEs in the information security area reviewed the web-based survey 
questionnaire and measurement items. SMEs provided advice to attain consensus in solving 
the problem, evaluate the course of action, and assess the web-based survey questionnaire. 







     Four hundred potential participants received a data collection survey. The web-based 
survey data presented a high-level overview of this research study, researcher contact 
information, and an estimated survey completion time frame. It showed details on ensuring 
confidentiality and anonymity of participants and assurance about using the data strictly for 
this research study. The participants received the urge to provide the most accurate and 
honest answers to the questions, and participants received thanks at the end of the survey. 
Instrument Development and Validation 
 
     Construct operationalization is the method of ensuring that variables are measured as 
impeccably as possible. This research study utilized an interval scale because it provides 
measurements where the difference between the values of two variables is expressive. One of 
the most successfully used interval scale measurements in social science is the Likert scale. 
The range of the seven-point Likert scale was (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = 
somewhat disagree; 4 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = somewhat agree; 6 = agree; 7 = 
strongly agree).  
     Each of the measurement items incorporated in this research study was reflective (Hair et 
al., 2017). This research study used the pre-validated measurement items verified in the 
former research. One of the survey items for the variable, protection behavior, was self-
developed; the rest of the survey items for all the dependent and independent variables were 
previously developed and validated in the prior literature (Churchill, 1979; Straub, 1989).   
     Appendix A showed a measurement item summary stating the complete list of all 
measurement items. Appendix B showed an overview of reliability evidence stating the 





understand the phenomenon in a new context of social engineering (Niederman & March, 
2015). Performing research on proven measurement items further validated, provided 
additional insight on the existing instrument scales, and supported future research about 
social engineering. 
Instrument Reliability and Validity 
 
     Instrument reliability safeguards that an instrument is reliable and measures dependably. 
Instrument validity defenses that reliable results are also valid. Instrument validity and 
reliability both are necessary. It is not possible to achieve instrument validity without 
achieving instrument reliability. Instrument reliability is a prerequisite for instrument 
validity. The subsequent steps ensured instrument reliability and validity in this research 
study.  
Internal Consistency Reliability 
 
     Cronbach's alpha calculation safeguarded the internal consistency reliability (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). All the factors in this research study had Cronbach’s alpha values 
well above 0.7 to ensure internal consistency reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Construct Validity and Content Validity 
 
     Factor analysis performed using SmartPLS software tested construct validity. Delphi 
study safeguarded the construct validity, content validity and attained agreement on survey 
instrument measurement items over two rounds before finalization. Three subject-matter 
experts (SMEs) participated in the Delphi study. 
Convergent Validity 
 
     Factor analysis safeguarded the convergent validity of the instrument (Fornell & Larcker, 





that the corresponding construct successfully clarifies. AVE is a degree of the discrepancy 
amount taken by a construct due to variance owing to measurement error. Hair et al. (2010) 
asserted that all constructs' AVE value should be more than the 0.5 minimum threshold. 
Discriminant Validity 
 
     The discriminant validity ensured the most solid relationships between a reflective 
construct and its indicators (Hair et al., 2010). This research study safeguarded the 






     The non-probability sampling approach is the approach that relies on the subjective 
judgment of the researcher. The purposive sampling approach is one of the types of non-
probability sampling approach. The research study's purposive sampling (also called 
judgment, subjective, or selective sampling) approach decisively pursued specific group 
members. Information technology (IT) users who are not IT professionals may have different 
views on social engineering breaches than IT professionals. The target group for this research 
study did not restrict to just IT professionals; any users who use information technology were 
eligible for the survey. The target group in this research study was IT users. 
Sampling Recruitment 
 
     The research study used emails to recruit participants. Response time was rapid, and the 
cost per participant was lesser without compromising the quality than other enrollment 
approaches (Steelman, Hammer, & Limayem, 2014). Participants were not compensated or 







     Cohen's (1992) statistical power analysis is one of the most prevalent methods in 
determining sampling size and an essential factor in designing experiments and testing results 
(Cappelleri, Darlington, & Trochim, 1994; Thomas & Juanes, 1996). Cohen's (1992) 
statistical power analysis utilizes the relationships among the five factors: sampling size, 
significance level, effect size, desired power, and estimated variance. Each of the five factors 
is a function of the other four for any statistical model (Cohen, 1992).  
     According to Cohen's (1992) statistical power analysis, any given statistical test can 
calculate sampling size by supplying values for the other four factors: significance level, 
effect size, desired power, and estimated variance. For this research study, the appropriate 
sampling size was at least one hundred and sixteen based on Cohen's (1992) statistical power 
analysis table at a statistical power of 80%, a medium effect size of .30, and a significance 
level of 0.05. 
     The plan to attain a large enough sampling size subsequently determined the total number 
of target participants (Cohen, 1988; Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). The goal was to solicit a 
response from at least one hundred and sixteen participants. With a 29% estimated 
completion rate, a web-based survey targeted four hundred participants. Only U.S.A. 
residents received the survey. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
     The web-based survey captured participants’ demographics and background information, 
including gender, age, education, and social engineering breach exposure (Steelman et al., 
2014). Table 2 showed the participants’ demographic and background information questions 






Participants Demographics and Background Questions 
Item Questions Scale  Options 
 
     





 1 = Male; 2 = Female, 3 = Other 





 1 = 18–24; 2 = 25–34; 3 = 35–44; 4 = 
45–54; 5 = 55–64; 6 = Over 65 Years 
 





 1 = Some School, No Degree; 2 = High 
School Graduate; 3 = Some College, No 
Degree; 4 = Associate’s Degree; 5 = 
Bachelor’s Degree; 6 = Master’s 






What is your 














     Reliability and validity examinations comprised preliminary statistical analysis. The 
reliability check encompassed Cronbach’s alpha, while the validity verification involved 
convergent and discriminant validity (Cronbach, 1951). There were no questions where all 
the answers were identical. The research study checked the Mahalanobis distance in the pre-
testing phase (Mahalanobis, 1936). The Mahalanobis distance is equal to the distance 
between two points in the multivariate arena. The Mahalanobis distance measures distance 
relative to the central point. The benefit of using Mahalanobis distance was to recognize and 





Common Method Bias  
 
     Common method bias (CMB, also known as common method variance, CMV) are the 
variations created by the measuring method rather than constructs the measures are supposed 
to measure (Schaller, Patil, & Malhotra, 2014). The questions on the web-based survey were 
unambiguous, and the web-based survey requested the participants to answer the questions 
with honesty and sincerity to reduce common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
 
     The data was analyzed and interpreted using Structural Equation Modeling, considering 
the research question and PMT (Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub, 2011). PLS-SEM is a Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM), a vigorous technique that permits assessing intricate cause-effect 
relationship models involving latent variables (Hair et al., 2019). The partial Least Squares 
Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) method verified the research model.  
     The PLS-SEM comprises two sub-models. The two sub-models are measurement and 
structural models. It allows adequate valuation of the measurement and structural models 
(Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). The measurement model signifies the relationships between the 
observed data and the latent variables and links the measurable indicators to the unobservable 
latent variables (Chin, 1998). The structural model implies the relationships between latent 
variables while the path coefficients verify the relationships between independent and 
dependent variables. PLS-SEM analysis in this research study utilized SmartPLS, version 







Formats for Presenting Results 
 
     The table format presented the construct reliability and validity summary and the 
hypotheses test summary. Furthermore, the figure format displayed the research model. The 
Appendices showed the survey questionnaire and IRB approval.  
Resource Requirements 
 
     This research study utilized the Delphi method to fetch advice from an expert panel of 
information security professionals. Feedback from the expert panel aided in measurement 
item improvements. The data sample originated from a pool of users working in the U.S.A. 
Each step of the research study required the use of software, hardware, and technology. 
Moreover, the web-based tool Google® Forms abetted in survey instrument development and 
participants’ data collection. 
     Microsoft® Excel assisted in participant’s data summarization and synthesis. 
Furthermore, IBM® SPSS® Statistics supported descriptive statistics, ANOVA, and the 
creation of graphs. Scholarly books reference provided critical contributions to this research 
study. Journals and peer-reviewed articles written by experts provided a viewpoint of 
significant historical research conducted. Alvin Sherman Library of Nova Southeastern 
University provided access to journals and peer-reviewed articles.  
Summary 
 
     This chapter described the rationale for selecting a specific methodology to gather, 
process, and summarized information to understand the problem. It described plans for 
conducting the research methods, data collection, and data analysis. The web survey, 
prepared using pre-validated items from the broader PMT literature, conducted the data 





procedures, and instruments. In addition, it specified that data were collected and analyzed 
using a reliable and recognized method in the field of this research study. It included details 
about IRB approval to guard human participants' privileges and well-being in this research 
study. It offered adequate material to permit other researchers to repeat this research study. It 















     This chapter states the results of the quantitative analysis of the research study. It 
demonstrates the complete PLS-SEM evaluation of the research model. Moreover, this 
chapter begins with survey validation, Delphi study, data collection, data screening utilizing 
Mahalanobis distance and normality test, and demographics. The rest of the chapter presents 
data analysis in two parts, first measurement model testing and then structural model testing. 
The measurement model assessment includes convergent validity, construct reliability and 
validity, outer loading, discriminant validity, and model fit. The structural model evaluation 
includes collinearity, path coefficients, hypothesis summary, total effects, coefficient of 
determination, effect size, predictive relevance, important-performance map analysis, and 
PLS predict. 
Survey Validation and Delphi Study 
 
     Upon following the IRB approval process, an IRB approval letter was received (Appendix 
C). The Google® Forms assisted in survey creation. A panel of three information security 
SMEs evaluated the web-based survey as part of the Delphi study. The purpose of the Delphi 
study was to refine the participant survey and seek expert opinion. Literature reviews are 
essential and provide valuable information for the survey items; the use of SMEs in the 
Delphi method provides crucial guidance and practical knowledge (Gray & Hovav, 2014; 





     SMEs were selected based on their information security domain experience. The first 
SME was a Chief Information Security Officer, the second SME was an Information Security 
Manager, and the third SME was an Information Security Analyst. Furthermore, the SMEs 
remained anonymous as per the original plan. The survey was distributed to SMEs using 
emails on November 30, 2020. Subsequently, SMEs studied the survey and provided 
recommendations. All three responses from the SMEs were received by December 5, 2020. 
The responses received from the SMEs were mainly optimistic, as they found the survey 
effective and coherent. SMEs provided two recommendations. The first recommendation was 
to have all the measurement items related to questions mandatory to ensure that participants 
responded successfully. The second recommendation was to offer a short explanation of the 
constructs in the survey, which helped the participants understand the meanings of the 
constructs.  
     All measurement items in the participant survey resulted in a mandatory entry as per 
SMEs’ suggestions. Similarly, a short explanation was added to the construct name for ease 
of understanding as per SMEs’ suggestions. Overall, SME recommendations enhanced the 
survey with meaningful and valuable updates.  
Data Collection 
 
     The data collection spanned from January 1, 2021, to January 25, 2021. The survey was 
not just limited to information technology professionals. The survey targeted any individuals 
who are information technology users. The survey recipients included the range starting from 
the individuals who are information technology users to information technology 
professionals. The survey recipients were professionals in a professional network, including 





years of experience to decades of experience. Since the participants belonged to a 
professional network, the majority had extensive experience with information technology.  
     Email and LinkedIn were valuable tools to manage the communication for survey 
completion. The email content (Appendix D) included the participant survey (Appendix E). 
The survey provided clear information about the survey purpose and the expected time to 
complete the survey. The survey stated that the participation was voluntary and anonymous, 
and responses were confidential.  
     Data collection utilized the cross-sectional method. The research study used the individual 
unit of analysis and purposive sampling approach. The survey was distributed to four 
hundred individuals using email. The first phase included emails sent to the four hundred 
individuals by January 1st, 2021. Consequently, a total of twenty-five responses were 
received by January 8th, 2021. The second phase included emails sent to the same individuals 
by January 8th, 2021. Until then, a total of seventy-five responses were received by January 
18th, 2021. The third and the last phase included emails sent to the same individuals by 
January 18th, 2021. The survey was closed on January 25th, 2021. As a result, a total of one 
hundred twenty-nine participants completed the survey with a response rate of 32%.  
Data Screening  
 
     The data was loaded into Microsoft® Excel to import into IBM® SPSS® Statistics for 
pre-analysis of the data. 
Mahalanobis Distance 
 
     IBM® SPSS® Statistics aided with the pre-analysis activities. The Mahalanobis distance 
is a multi-dimensional generalization of the idea that evaluates the distance between a point 





Chi-square critical value as per Chi-square (χ²) distribution (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017). 
Based on this, Chi-square distribution table criteria was 93.17 using fifty five degrees of 
freedom (df=55) and Chi-square critical value (p < .001) (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013). 
Mahalanobis distance calculation identified seven outliers (11, 33, 44, 65, 71, 93, 114) with 
Mahalanobis distance exceeding the criteria of 93.17 (Appendix F). Mertler and Reinhart 
(2017) recommended analyzing extreme values before taking further action. The next step 
was to remove five out of the seven extreme outliers (11, 33, 65, 71, 93) and keep two 
outliers with the lowest values (44, 114) in the data. Appendix G showed the results of 
Mahalanobis distance recalculation. The data showed only two values (42, 109) exceeding 
the criteria of 93.17. Further data analysis retained both the data sets.     
Normality Test 
 
     Normality test results, including normality and scatter plot, ANOVA, histogram, normal 
P-P plot, and scatter plot, were analyzed (Appendix H) (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013). The 
skewness value showed the symmetry of the distribution, and the kurtosis value showed the 
peakedness of the distribution. Skewness and kurtosis decreased after removing five extreme 
values (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). As a result, skewness and kurtosis values were 
0.645 and 1.453, respectively, in an acceptable range (Kline, 2011). The normal P-P plot and 
the normal Q-Q plot showed most of the instances very close to the central diagonal line 
demonstrating adequate range (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017; Tabachnick, Fidell, & Ullman, 
2007). The R-squared value described the dependent variable variation percentage that the 
research model described. The R-squared value of 66% was in the suitable range. The overall 








     The demographic variables gathered were gender, age, education, social engineering, and 
information security breach exposure. Sixty-six participants were males (51.16%), sixty-two 
participants were females (48.06%), and one participant identified in the other category. 
Table 3 exhibited the participants' gender distribution. 
Table 3 




Male 66 51.16% 
Female 62 48.06% 
Other 1 0.78% 
Total 129 100.00% 
 
     The most of participants were between the ages of 45-54 (28.68%), followed by 55-64 
(23.26%), 35-44 (22.48%), 25-34 (12.40%), over 65 years (10.08%), and 18-24 (3.1%). 
Table 4 displayed the participants' age distribution. 
Table 4 




18-24 4 3.10% 
25-34 16 12.40% 
35-44 29 22.48% 
45-54 37 28.68% 
55-64 30 23.26% 
Over 65 Years 13 10.08% 






     The most of participants had a Bachelor’s degree (51.16), followed by a Master’s degree 
(18.6%), Associate degree (10.85%), some college and no degree (9.3%), high school 
graduate (6.98%), Doctoral degree (2.33%), and some school no degree (0.78%). Table 5 
presented the participants' education distribution. 
Table 5 




Some School, No Degree 1 0.78% 
High School Graduate 9 6.98% 
Some College, No Degree 12 9.30% 
Associate's Degree 14 10.85% 
Bachelor's Degree 66 51.16% 
Master's Degree 24 18.60% 
Doctoral Degree 3 2.33% 
Total 129 100.00% 
 
     71.32% of participants had some exposure to social engineering breaches, 24.03% had 
extensive exposure to social engineering breaches, and 4.65% had no exposure to social 
engineering breaches. Table 6 demonstrated the participants' social engineering breach 
exposure demographics. 
Table 6 




None 6 4.65% 
Some 92 71.32% 
Extensive 31 24.03% 










     The data was loaded into CSV format to import into SmartPLS, version 3.0, for analysis.  
In general, there are different approaches for analyzing the formative versus reflective 
measurement model. The constructs in this research study were reflective. The research 
model evaluation included measurement and structural models (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004; 
Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 2000).  
Measurement Model  
 
     The measurement model signified the relationships between the observed data and the 
latent variables. The measurement model estimated the latent variables as its manifest 
variables’ weighted sum (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Henseler & Chin, 2010). The measurement 
model analysis encompassed an in-depth analysis of the relationships between manifest 
indicators. The evaluation included outer loadings, composite reliability and validity, 
Cronbach’s alpha (α), average variance extracted (AVE), cross-loadings, and model fit. 
Convergent Validity and Outer Loadings 
 
     Convergent validity states the degree to which a measure compares positively with the 
same construct’s alternative measures (Hair et al., 2017). Convergent validity evaluation 
comprised of construct measurement item’s outer loadings assessment. Table 7 exhibited the 
initial values for outer loadings for each construct’s measurement items. Moreover, Table 7 
highlighted SP04 and SP05 because their values were below 0.40 (Hair et al., 2010). The 
further analysis excluded the indicator’s outer loadings with a value below 0.40 (Hair et al., 








Initial Outer Loadings 
Item Loading Item Loading Item Loading 
Perceived Severity Response efficacy Security Policies 
PS01 0.84 RE01 0.977 SP01 0.959 
PS02 0.862 RE02 0.923 SP02 0.945 
PS03 0.853 RE03 0.935 SP03 0.602 
PS04 0.944 RE04 0.932 SP04 0.332 
PS05 0.948 RE05 0.913 SP05 0.368 
      
Perceived Vulnerability Self-efficacy Protection Motivation 
PV01 0.826 SE01 0.973 PM01 0.965 
PV02 0.854 SE02 0.943 PM02 0.902 
PV03 0.779 SE03 0.917 PM03 0.871 
PV04 0.898 SE04 0.932 PM04 0.91 
PV05 0.95 SE05 0.937 PM05 0.898 
     
Fear Response Cost Protection Behavior 
FE01 0.78 RC01 0.693 PB01 0.87 
FE02 0.979 RC02 0.817 PB02 0.903 
FE03 0.805 RC03 0.772 PB03 0.87 
FE04 0.808 RC04 0.803 PB04 0.834 
FE05 0.909 RC05 0.762 PB05 0.856 
     
Maladaptive Rewards SETA Program   
MR01 0.832 ST01 0.931   
MR02 0.895 ST02 0.866   
MR03 0.872 ST03 0.873   
MR04 0.961 ST04 0.853   
MR05 0.92 ST05 0.854   
 











Final Outer Loadings  
Item Loading Item Loading Item Loading 
Perceived Severity Response efficacy Security Policies 
PS01 0.84 RE01 0.977 SP01 0.958 
PS02 0.862 RE02 0.923 SP02 0.942 
PS03 0.853 RE03 0.935 SP03 0.614 
PS04 0.944 RE04 0.932   
PS05 0.948 RE05 0.913   
      
Perceived Vulnerability Self-efficacy Protection Motivation 
PV01 0.826 SE01 0.973 PM01 0.965 
PV02 0.854 SE02 0.943 PM02 0.902 
PV03 0.779 SE03 0.917 PM03 0.871 
PV04 0.898 SE04 0.932 PM04 0.91 
PV05 0.95 SE05 0.937 PM05 0.898 
     
Fear Response Cost Protection Behavior 
FE01 0.78 RC01 0.693 PB01 0.871 
FE02 0.979 RC02 0.817 PB02 0.903 
FE03 0.805 RC03 0.772 PB03 0.87 
FE04 0.808 RC04 0.803 PB04 0.833 
FE05 0.909 RC05 0.762 PB05 0.856 
     
Maladaptive Rewards SETA Program   
MR01 0.832 ST01 0.931   
MR02 0.895 ST02 0.866   
MR03 0.872 ST03 0.873   
MR04 0.961 ST04 0.853   












Construct Reliability and Validity 
 
     Table 9 presented internal consistency Cronbach's Alpha (α) statistics. Cronbach’s Alpha 
statistics values between 0.60 and 0.70 are considered less than desirable (Hair et al., 2010). 
Cronbach’s Alpha statistics values should be greater than 0.70 (Cronbach, 1951). All the 
constructs had Cronbach's Alpha greater than 0.70, hence fulfilled construct reliability 
criteria. 
     Convergent validity criteria include Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values required to 
be greater than 0.50 (Hair et al., 2010). Convergent validity criteria also comprise that the 
AVE's square root must be greater than 0.707 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Götz, Liehr-
Gobbers, & Krafft, 2010). Therefore, all the constructs’ AVE being greater than 0.50 and the 
square root of the AVE being greater than 0.707 resulted in acceptable convergent reliability 
and validity criteria. 
Table 9 














Fear 0.91 0.926 0.933 0.739 
Maladaptive rewards 0.939 0.939 0.954 0.805 
Protection Behavior 0.917 0.921 0.938 0.752 
Protection Motivation 0.948 0.95 0.96 0.827 
Perceived Severity 0.934 0.938 0.95 0.793 
Perceived Vulnerability 0.914 0.926 0.936 0.746 
Response Cost 0.834 0.857 0.879 0.594 
Response Efficacy 0.965 0.966 0.973 0.877 
Self-efficacy 0.967 0.987 0.975 0.885 
Security Policies 0.812 0.943 0.885 0.727 










     The discriminant validity requires that a reflective construct has the most solid 
relationships with its indicators than the other constructs (Götz et al., 2010). Discriminant 
validity measured the degree to which a construct was empirically different from other 
constructs (Hair et al., 2017). Three criteria, including cross-loadings, the Fornell-Larcker 
criterion, and the Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT), were utilized.  
    The cross-loading criterion means that a manifest indicator’s outer loading should surpass 
its outer loadings on the remaining constructs (Hair et al., 2017). Cross-loadings of the threat 
appraisal items are shown in Table 10, coping appraisal items in Table 11, and protection 
items in Table 12. Indicators had the most substantial relationship with their assigned latent 
construct than the remaining latent constructs (Gefen & Straub, 2005). Each indicator stated 
the maximum value with its corresponding construct, whereas all remaining cross-loadings 
were lower than its related construct. All indicators had a minimum value of 0.70 (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). The indicators had the most solid relationship with their assigned latent 
construct than with the remaining latent constructs. The difference was at least .10 or more 
between the loading and the next highest loading, therefore, satisfying the cross-loading 




































Perceived Severity          
PS01 0.489 0.279 0.461 0.508 0.840 0.43 -0.047 0.358 0.053 0.119 0.326 
PS02 0.508 0.236 0.347 0.365 0.862 0.306 -0.035 0.257 0.101 0.07 0.342 
PS03 0.476 0.258 0.378 0.441 0.853 0.383 0.062 0.355 0.104 0.067 0.312 
PS04 0.545 0.246 0.461 0.517 0.944 0.388 -0.02 0.36 0.103 0.07 0.362 
PS05 0.493 0.242 0.366 0.474 0.948 0.385 -0.008 0.367 0.064 0.034 0.312 
 
Perceived Vulnerability          
PV01 0.636 0.544 0.598 0.574 0.422 0.826 0.028 0.571 0.196 0.125 0.438 
PV02 0.433 0.417 0.538 0.597 0.358 0.854 0.148 0.676 0.181 0.037 0.408 
PV03 0.299 0.258 0.388 0.47 0.299 0.779 0.05 0.441 0.22 0.082 0.202 
PV04 0.385 0.404 0.489 0.544 0.32 0.898 0.143 0.542 0.237 0.185 0.374 
PV05 0.504 0.411 0.528 0.576 0.413 0.950 0.077 0.577 0.189 0.062 0.357 
 
Fear            
FE01 0.780 0.207 0.385 0.33 0.362 0.349 -0.067 0.251 0.037 -0.049 0.307 
FE02 0.979 0.339 0.54 0.545 0.54 0.506 -0.025 0.432 0.155 0.005 0.411 
FE03 0.805 0.351 0.535 0.473 0.452 0.485 -0.017 0.422 0.163 0.032 0.318 
FE04 0.808 0.383 0.51 0.528 0.448 0.464 0.052 0.461 0.094 0.027 0.342 
FE05 0.909 0.381 0.574 0.58 0.583 0.49 0.034 0.524 0.205 0.124 0.477 
 
Maladaptive Rewards          
MR01 0.357 0.832 0.462 0.328 0.165 0.369 0.05 0.463 0.157 0.161 0.457 
MR02 0.382 0.895 0.451 0.334 0.27 0.442 0.126 0.414 0.181 0.163 0.546 
MR03 0.323 0.872 0.456 0.326 0.287 0.484 0.155 0.352 0.165 0.151 0.484 
MR04 0.362 0.961 0.47 0.335 0.278 0.446 0.094 0.438 0.129 0.184 0.526 





































RE01 0.504 0.468 0.65 0.708 0.388 0.66 0.151 0.977 0.251 0.186 0.456 
RE02 0.434 0.442 0.605 0.654 0.392 0.587 0.214 0.923 0.335 0.23 0.428 
RE03 0.414 0.441 0.592 0.619 0.31 0.603 0.215 0.935 0.275 0.191 0.404 
RE04 0.477 0.445 0.642 0.687 0.385 0.596 0.197 0.932 0.272 0.221 0.433 
RE05 0.498 0.379 0.668 0.663 0.313 0.631 0.149 0.913 0.219 0.173 0.448 
 
Self-efficacy 
SE01 0.212 0.257 0.429 0.374 0.139 0.288 0.148 0.392 0.973 0.24 0.359 
SE02 0.113 0.169 0.317 0.293 0.066 0.242 0.146 0.261 0.943 0.172 0.304 
SE03 0.146 0.118 0.357 0.282 0.095 0.177 0.112 0.226 0.917 0.2 0.263 
SE04 0.124 0.107 0.276 0.269 0.067 0.19 0.091 0.212 0.932 0.159 0.201 
SE05 0.139 0.15 0.312 0.243 0.061 0.177 0.051 0.219 0.937 0.169 0.267 
 
Response Cost 
RC01 0.031 0.127 0.065 0.079 -0.062 0.062 0.693 0.089 0.059 0.153 -0.023 
RC02 -0.076 0.066 0.133 0.199 -0.046 0.076 0.817 0.168 0.138 0.097 0.015 
RC03 0.031 0.077 0.143 0.166 -0.038 0.109 0.772 0.215 0.143 0.09 0.022 
RC04 0.052 0.087 0.142 0.191 0.009 0.06 0.803 0.139 0.109 0.189 -0.053 









































SP01 0.059 0.22 0.156 0.166 0.1 0.151 0.155 0.242 0.221 0.958 0.154 
SP02 -0.002 0.112 0.14 0.127 0.051 0.071 0.169 0.152 0.185 0.942 0.151 
SP03 0.062 0.108 0.06 0.119 0.052 0.04 0.046 0.15 0.073 0.614 0.107 
 
SETA Program 
ST01 0.412 0.628 0.479 0.355 0.329 0.467 0.027 0.415 0.335 0.16 0.931 
ST02 0.453 0.451 0.535 0.483 0.403 0.375 -0.001 0.538 0.239 0.179 0.866 
ST03 0.33 0.409 0.472 0.398 0.357 0.325 -0.041 0.445 0.246 0.211 0.873 
ST04 0.352 0.509 0.355 0.268 0.227 0.355 -0.029 0.295 0.27 0.046 0.853 
ST05 0.345 0.503 0.314 0.207 0.261 0.312 -0.052 0.242 0.229 0.061 0.854 
 
Protection Motivation 
PM01 0.568 0.356 0.695 0.965 0.488 0.594 0.172 0.663 0.264 0.1 0.367 
PM02 0.544 0.288 0.624 0.902 0.443 0.57 0.182 0.602 0.273 0.12 0.308 
PM03 0.513 0.202 0.588 0.871 0.48 0.506 0.131 0.564 0.242 0.066 0.317 
PM04 0.5 0.427 0.685 0.91 0.464 0.647 0.209 0.704 0.36 0.176 0.412 
PM05 0.527 0.402 0.685 0.898 0.495 0.605 0.265 0.695 0.294 0.252 0.449 
 
Protection Behavior 
PB01 0.551 0.476 0.871 0.678 0.429 0.574 0.139 0.661 0.253 0.022 0.424 
PB02 0.583 0.502 0.903 0.648 0.38 0.524 0.157 0.576 0.406 0.169 0.486 
PB03 0.483 0.444 0.87 0.572 0.4 0.487 0.131 0.523 0.385 0.237 0.452 
PB04 0.398 0.39 0.833 0.54 0.3 0.431 0.104 0.49 0.326 0.229 0.427 
PB05 0.563 0.442 0.856 0.678 0.451 0.566 0.131 0.657 0.226 0.019 0.418 
 
     Fornell and Larcker criterion is a reliable method for evaluating discriminant validity and 
preventing multicollinearity issues (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity requires the 
square root of every AVE value related to each latent construct to be more significant than 
any correlation amongst any latent constructs pair (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Every AVE 
































FE 0.859           
MR 0.395 0.897          
PB 0.6 0.522 0.867         
PM 0.583 0.374 0.723 0.91        
PS 0.565 0.284 0.455 0.521 0.891       
PV 0.54 0.485 0.599 0.645 0.427 0.863      
RC 0 0.115 0.154 0.213 -0.012 0.102 0.771     
RE 0.498 0.465 0.675 0.713 0.383 0.658 0.197 0.936    
SE 0.16 0.177 0.366 0.317 0.095 0.234 0.121 0.288 0.941   
SP 0.04 0.177 0.15 0.16 0.081 0.113 0.159 0.214 0.203 0.853  
ST 0.438 0.567 0.509 0.41 0.372 0.424 -0.018 0.464 0.302 0.162 0.876 
 
     Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio is a dependable criterion to complement the Fornell-
Larcker (1981) and cross-loadings to evaluate discriminant validity (Henseler, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2015). The complete bootstrapping function in SmartPLS 3.0 generated the HTMT 
value to assess discriminant validity. The bootstrap calculation, with the number of cases 
parameter equal to 5,000, two-tailed test type, and significance level of 0.05, was performed. 
Table 14 showed the HTMT ratio evaluation results. As per the HTMT criterion for 
discriminant validity, the HTMT statistic confidence interval did not surpass 1 for all 
combinations of constructs (Hair et al., 2017). Discriminant validity between latent 




































MR -> FE 0.42 0.422 0.246 0.581 RE -> RC 0.21 0.23 0.08 0.482 
PB -> FE 0.645 0.647 0.537 0.738 SE -> FE 0.159 0.18 0.066 0.342 
PB -> MR 0.56 0.556 0.353 0.707 SE -> MR 0.179 0.19 0.063 0.377 
PM -> FE 0.618 0.616 0.503 0.715 SE -> PB 0.384 0.38 0.195 0.559 
PM -> MR 0.391 0.389 0.184 0.572 SE -> PM 0.323 0.32 0.111 0.506 
PM -> PB 0.769 0.764 0.626 0.867 SE -> PS 0.096 0.13 0.05 0.273 
PS -> FE 0.604 0.604 0.462 0.729 SE -> PV 0.246 0.25 0.075 0.443 
PS -> MR 0.303 0.309 0.134 0.483 SE -> RC 0.135 0.17 0.081 0.346 
PS -> PB 0.486 0.485 0.331 0.621 SE -> RE 0.289 0.28 0.084 0.487 
PS -> PM 0.551 0.55 0.383 0.694 SP -> FE 0.088 0.14 0.074 0.267 
PV -> FE 0.569 0.565 0.415 0.694 SP -> MR 0.197 0.22 0.07 0.463 
PV -> MR 0.51 0.508 0.322 0.667 SP -> PB 0.171 0.23 0.096 0.438 
PV -> PB 0.64 0.633 0.476 0.762 SP -> PM 0.18 0.2 0.066 0.424 
PV -> PM 0.686 0.678 0.542 0.786 SP -> PS 0.091 0.14 0.054 0.313 
PV -> PS 0.453 0.45 0.284 0.596 SP -> PV 0.128 0.18 0.085 0.354 
RC -> FE 0.077 0.155 0.088 0.269 SP -> RC 0.197 0.24 0.109 0.432 
RC -> MR 0.144 0.196 0.08 0.419 SP -> RE 0.241 0.25 0.071 0.492 
RC -> PB 0.163 0.205 0.083 0.445 SP -> SE 0.208 0.23 0.075 0.419 
RC -> PM 0.225 0.243 0.084 0.492 ST -> FE 0.465 0.46 0.307 0.598 
RC -> PS 0.086 0.149 0.083 0.263 ST -> MR 0.611 0.61 0.414 0.768 
RC -> PV 0.121 0.184 0.088 0.387 ST -> PB 0.533 0.52 0.317 0.69 
RE -> FE 0.519 0.518 0.39 0.628 ST -> PM 0.414 0.41 0.208 0.589 
RE -> MR 0.489 0.484 0.296 0.641 ST -> PS 0.386 0.39 0.225 0.532 
RE -> PB 0.712 0.7 0.532 0.831 ST -> PV 0.442 0.44 0.247 0.621 
RE -> PM 0.742 0.735 0.596 0.837 ST -> RC 0.058 0.15 0.077 0.293 
RE -> PS 0.401 0.397 0.213 0.55 ST -> RE 0.466 0.46 0.236 0.639 
RE -> PV 0.693 0.688 0.518 0.817 ST -> SE 0.312 0.31 0.114 0.506 




     Model Fit included Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) assessment. 





correlation and the observed correlation (Henseler, Hubona, & Ray, 2016). A value of zero 
specifies perfect fit, given that the SRMR is an absolute measure of fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
SRMR value of less than 0.08 is an acceptable value (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Table 15 showed 
model fit results. The SRMR value was 0.0686 for the estimated model, resulting in a good 








SRMR 0.065 0.074 
d_ULS 5.998 7.765 
d_G 5.542 5.66 
Chi-Square 2731.608 2752.761 
NFI 0.686 0.684 
   
 
     In conclusion, the measurement model analysis was sufficient to begin the next set of 
investigations for the structural model. 
Structural Model  
 
     The structural model signified the relationships amongst the latent constructs (Wong, 
2013). Evaluation incorporated collinearity statistics (VIF), coefficient of determination (R2), 
path coefficients (β), effect size (f2), predictive relevance (Q2), Importance-Performance Map 
Analysis (IPMA), and PLS predict (Q2 Predict).  
Collinearity 
 
     Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), a measure of collinearity, provided the reciprocal of the 
tolerance (Hair et al., 2017). In most cases, the VIF values lower than five have been 





results. The VIF values were below five for the estimated model, representing acceptable 
collinearity. 
Table 16 








Perceived severity 1.223 1.525  
Perceived vulnerability 1.223 2.100  
Fear  1.848  
Maladaptive rewards  1.407  
Response efficacy  2.048  
Self-efficacy  1.103  
Response Cost  1.065  
SETA Program   1.216 
Security Policies   1.038 




     Path coefficient values range between -1 to +1, with 0 or close to 0 stating statistically 
insignificant impact (Hair et al., 2017). The individual path coefficients were derived as the 
following steps, as shown in Table 17. The evaluation of algebraic signs and values of path 
coefficients followed next. t statistics and p-value evaluation demonstrated the significance 






























Fear      
PS -> FE 0.408 0.408 0.074 5.488 <.001 
PV -> FE 0.366 0.37 0.076 4.786 <.001 
 
Protection Motivation      
FE -> PM 0.176 0.175 0.076 2.313 0.021 
PS -> PM 0.194 0.192 0.083 2.325 0.020 
PV -> PM 0.202 0.194 0.084 2.391 0.017 
MR -> PM -0.064 -0.058 0.069 0.932 0.351 
RE -> PM 0.395 0.392 0.084 4.702 <.001 
SE -> PM 0.107 0.109 0.055 1.936 0.053 
RC -> PM 0.111 0.119 0.065 1.709 0.088 
 
Protection Behavior      
ST -> PB 0.254 0.249 0.098 2.593 0.01 
SP -> PB 0.010 0.013 0.07 0.139 0.89 
PM -> PB 0.617 0.615 0.075 8.273 <.001 
 








Figure 2. Final Research Model 
Hypothesis Summary 
 
     T statistics values should be greater than 1.96 (Two-Tailed test type and significance level 
of 0.05) to support a hypothesis (Hair et al., 2017). The direct effect of perceived severity on 
fear was statistically significant (β= 0.408, p<0.001, t= 5.488), supporting hypothesis H1. This 
result indicated that the degree to which a user believes in the danger would create 
substantial damage impacts their fear, as demonstrated by the work of Floyd et al. (2000). 
Similarly, the direct effect of perceived vulnerability on fear was statistically significant (β= 
0.366, p<0.001, t=4.786), supporting hypothesis H2. This result specified that a user’s 
credence in their exposure to social engineering impacts their emotional response to that 
danger, as demonstrated by the work of Floyd et al. (2000). The direct effect of fear on 
protection motivation was statistically significant (β= 0.176, p<0.05, t=2.313), supporting 





against social engineering breaches, as established by the research of Rogers (1975) and 
Witte (1994). 
     The direct effect of perceived severity on protection motivation was statistically 
significant (β=0.194, p<<0.05, t=2.325), supporting hypothesis H4. This effect indicated that 
the users’ belief in the degree of substantial damage impacts their motivation to exhibit 
protection behavior, as shown by the research of Crossler and Bélanger (2014). Additionally, 
the direct effect of perceived vulnerability on protection motivation was statistically 
significant (β=0.202, p<0.05, t=2.391), supporting hypothesis H5. This effect specified a 
user’s susceptibility in their exposure to social engineering impacts their motivation to 
exhibit protection behavior, as demonstrated by the work of Ifinedo (2012). 
     The direct effect of maladaptive rewards on protection motivation was statistically 
insignificant (β=-0.064, p=0.351, t=0.932), not supporting hypothesis H6. This result specified 
that the perceived benefits of not executing protection behaviors to prevent social 
engineering breaches did not influence users’ motivation to perform these protection 
behaviors (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). The direct effect of response efficacy on 
protection motivation was statistically significant (β=0.395, p<0.001, t=4.702), supporting 
hypothesis H7. This result implied that users’ confidence in the efficiency of a protection 
behavior to prevent social engineering breach is correlated to their motivation to exhibit these 
behaviors, as demonstrated by the research of Yoon et al. (2012). 
     The direct effect of self-efficacy on protection motivation was statistically insignificant 
(β=0.107, p=0.053, t=1.936), not supporting hypothesis H8. This result implied that users’ 
belief in their ability to perform protection action does not impact their motivation to perform 





on protection motivation was statistically insignificant (β=0.111, p=0.088, t=1.709), not 
supporting hypothesis H9. This result showed that users’ perception of the costs acquired by 
execution of protection has no significant influence on their motivation to perform these 
protection behaviors (Ng et al., 2009). The direct effect of protection motivation on 
protection behavior was statistically significant (β=0.617, p<0.001, t=8.273), supporting 
hypothesis H10. This effect implied that users’ motivation to perform protection behaviors to 
prevent social engineering breaches is correlated to their recital of these behaviors, as 
demonstrated by the research of Boss et al. (2015). 
     The direct effect of the SETA program on protection behavior was statistically significant 
(β=0.254, p=0.01, t=2.593), supporting hypothesis H11. This result showed that an 
organization’s SETA program significantly impacts users’ protection behavior to prevent 
social engineering breaches (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007). The direct effect of security policies 
on protection behavior was statistically insignificant (β=0..01, p=0.89, t=0.139), not 
supporting hypothesis H12. This result showed that an organization’s security policies do not 
significantly impact users’ protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches (Lee et 
al., 2004). One of the reasons could be that the user is not well-aware of the organization’s 













Hypothesis  Result  
H1 Perceived severity is positively associated with fear. Supported 
H2 Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with fear. Supported 
H3 Fear is positively associated with protection motivation. Supported 
H4 Perceived severity is positively associated with protection motivation. Supported 
H5 Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with protection motivation. Supported 
H6 Maladaptive rewards are negatively associated with protection motivation. Not Supported 
H7 Response efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation. Supported 
H8 Self-efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation. Not Supported 
H9 Response cost is negatively associated with protection motivation. Not Supported 
H10 Protection motivation is positively associated with protection behavior. Supported 
H11 SETA program is positively associated with protection behavior. Supported 




     Bootstrapping utilizes resampling methods to determine the significance of PLS 
coefficients. PLS-SEM relies on a bootstrap procedure to make statistical inferences. 
Bootstrapping output evaluation encompassed the direct, indirect, and total effects. The total 
effect was the sum of direct and indirect effects, as shown in Table 19. Direct effects were 
the relationships between two latent constructs directly connected by a single-headed arrow 
(Hair et al., 2017). On the other hand, indirect effects were the relationships between two 
latent constructs not directly connected by a single-headed arrow; though, a third construct 
intervened (Hair et al., 2017).  
     The response efficacy had the maximum direct effect on protection motivation than any 
other independent constructs (i.e., perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear, 
maladaptive rewards, self-efficacy, and response costs). Therefore, the most significant 
impact on protection motivation is a user’s belief in the efficiency of the recommended 
























Fear      
PS -> FE 0.408 0.408 0.074 5.488 <.001 
PV -> FE 0.366 0.37 0.076 4.786 <.001 
      
Protection Motivation     
FE -> PM 0.176 0.175 0.076 2.313 0.021 
PS -> PM 0.265 0.262 0.075 3.554 <.001 
PV -> PM 0.266 0.26 0.075 3.555 <.001 
MR -> PM -0.064 -0.058 0.069 0.932 0.351 
RE -> PM 0.395 0.392 0.084 4.702 <.001 
SE -> PM 0.107 0.109 0.055 1.936 0.053 
RC -> PM 0.111 0.119 0.065 1.709 0.088 
      
Protection Behavior     
ST -> PB 0.254 0.249 0.098 2.593 0.01 
SP -> PB 0.01 0.013 0.07 0.139 0.89 
PM -> PB 0.617 0.615 0.075 8.273 <.001 
FE -> PB 0.109 0.109 0.051 2.119 0.034 
PS -> PB 0.164 0.161 0.051 3.241 0.001 
PV -> PB 0.164 0.16 0.05 3.31 0.001 
MR -> PB -0.039 -0.035 0.042 0.941 0.347 
RE -> PB 0.244 0.241 0.059 4.157 <.001 
SE -> PB 0.066 0.067 0.036 1.838 0.066 
RC -> PB 0.069 0.073 0.041 1.682 0.093 
 
Coefficient of Determination 
 
     R2 results, also known as the coefficient of determination, provided a measure of the 
predictive power and fitness to the observed data in the regression analysis (Hair et al., 2017; 
Sarstedt, Wilczynski, & Melewar, 2013). R2 values assessed the exogenous latent variable’s 
cumulative effects on the endogenous latent variables as one of the essential steps for 





0.33, and 0.19 are substantial, moderate, and weak, correspondingly (Chin, 1998). Table 20 
exhibited R2 results for the estimated model. The estimated model in this research study 
could explain 42.8% of the variance in fear, 64.9 % of the variance in protection motivation, 
and 57.7% of the variance in protection behavior. As a result, R2 results exceeded the 






R Square Adjusted 
  
Fear 0.428 0.419 
Protection Motivation 0.649 0.628 




     Effect size (f2) evaluation provided the degree to which exogenous latent constructs 
contributed to the coefficient of determination of endogenous constructs. The f2 effect size 
values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are evaluated as small, median, and large effects (Hair et al., 
2017). Subsequently, effect size values of less than 0.02 are not affected (Hair et al., 2017). 






















Perceived severity 0.239 0.07  
Perceived vulnerability 0.191 0.055  
Fear  0.048  
Maladaptive rewards  0.008  
Response efficacy  0.218  
Self-efficacy  0.03  
Response Cost  0.033  
SETA Program   0.125 
Security Policies   0 




     The blindfolding procedure provided the predictive relevance (Q2) values of latent 
variables. The blindfolding process evaluated the Q2 of the path model by re-using the 
samples, systematically removing data points, and delivering a prediction of their original 
values (Hair et al., 2017). The blindfolding calculation encompassed an omission distance of 
seven. Table 22 displayed the results of the blindfolding. Overall, the Q2 values were above 







Protection Behavior 0.417 









Important-Performance Map Analysis 
 
     Importance-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA) outspreads the estimated model by 
adding the performance of each construct into the interpretation. It provides the evaluation on 
two dimensions, including importance and performance. IPMA for protection behavior 
incorporated selecting direct predecessors of the chosen target construct. Figure 3 presented 
IPMA results.  
 
 
Figure 3. Important-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA) 
PLS Predict 
 
     PLS predict assessment encompassed ten folds and repetitions to predict PLS path models 
and evaluate their predictive performance. PLS (partial least squares) model, as well as LM 
(linear regression) model evaluation, incorporated a comparison between the root means 





predict results. The PLS Q2 values were bigger than zero, and the Q2 LM values were lower 
than the Q2 PLS values, which confirmed acceptable PLS predict assessment. 
Table 23 
PLS Predict Assessment 
PLS LM PLS-LM 
 RMSE  MAE  Q²_predict  RMSE  MAE  Q²_predict  RMSE  MAE  Q²_predict  
PB01 0.928 0.732 0.412 1.074 0.846 0.212 -0.146 -0.114 0.2 
PB02 0.931 0.734 0.395 1.047 0.823 0.234 -0.116 -0.089 0.161 
PB03 1.044 0.832 0.345 1.244 0.997 0.069 -0.2 -0.165 0.276 
PB04 1.197 0.932 0.273 1.483 1.159 -0.116 -0.286 -0.227 0.389 
PB05 0.845 0.69 0.409 0.991 0.783 0.187 -0.146 -0.093 0.222 
 
     Appendix I showed additional comments collected from the participants. Participants 
captured their behavior to protect themselves from social engineering breaches in these 
comments. The additional comments were in synchronization with the constructs of the 
supported hypothesis. Here are the additional comments that supported the constructs, 
perceived severity (additional comment number 8), perceived vulnerability (additional 
comment number 11), fear (additional comment number 13), response efficacy (additional 
comment number 5), protection motivation (additional comment number 10), SETA program 
(additional comment number 3), and protection behavior (additional comment number 1).     
Summary 
 
     This chapter began with a discussion of the survey validation and Delphi study. 
Additionally, data screening comprised of Mahalanobis distance and Normality test. The 
Mahalanobis distance and Normality test were re-executed after removing five outliers. 
Furthermore, the chapter showed descriptive statistics related to the participants’ gender, age, 





     The measurement model was assessed by evaluating outer loadings, composite reliability 
and validity, Cronbach's alpha (α), average variance extracted (AVE), cross-loadings, and 
model fit. Further analysis removed the indicator’s outer loadings with a value below 0.40. 
All the constructs had Cronbach's Alpha (α) greater than 0.70, meeting construct reliability 
criteria. All average variance extracted (AVE) values were greater than 0.50, meeting 
convergent validity criteria. All three criteria, including cross-loadings, the Fornell-Larcker 
criterion, and the Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT), were utilized to validate discriminant 
validity. Lastly, the SRMR value was less than 0.08, confirming the model fit and concluding 
measurement mode evaluation. 
     The structural model was assessed by evaluating collinearity statistics (VIF), coefficient 
of determination (R2), path coefficients (β), effect size (f2), predictive relevance (Q2), 
Importance-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA), and PLS predict (Q2 Predict). The VIF 
values were lower than five, confirming collinearity. In addition, the path coefficients and 
total effects were analyzed and resulted in supporting eight out of twelve hypotheses. The 
estimated model in this research study could explain 42.8% of the variance in fear, 64.9 % of 
the variance in protection motivation, and 57.7% of the variance in protection behavior. The 
Q2 values were above zero, confirming the predictive relevance. IPMA provided the 
evaluation on two dimensions, including importance and performance. PLS predict 
assessment showed acceptable values concluding structural model assessment. The next 
chapter comprises a comprehensive discussion, limitations, implications, recommendations, 















     This research study examines the influences on users' protection behavior to prevent 
social engineering breaches and encompasses the development and empirical evaluation of a 
research model based on PMT full nomology, SETA program, and security policies. The 
previous chapter comprehended the quantitative research results from this research study. 
This chapter offers a thorough discussion of the results learned in the last chapter.  
     This discussion includes influences on fear, influences on protection motivation, 
influences on protection behavior, support for the research model, and support for the 
research question. The chapter then presents limitations, implications, contributions to 
theory, contributions to practice, and recommendations. Finally, the last part of the chapter 
provides conclusions and a thesis summary. 
Discussion  
 
     Social engineering is one of the most significant threats organizations face today. Social 
engineering involves persuading users to provide sensitive information to perform 
unauthorized actions to achieve illegitimate financial advances (Dodge et al., 2007). Despite 
several research studies completed in recent times in the social engineering area, there is a 
scarcity of theory-grounded empirical studies to prevent social engineering breaches. An 
empirical investigation of protection motivation and protection behavior to prevent social 
engineering breaches utilizing PMT full nomology, SETA program, and security policies did 





Influences on Fear 
 
     A robust and flexible theory, protection motivation theory, was primarily designed to 
explicate fear appeals (Rogers, 1975). Prior research leveraging PMT did not include the 
critical parameter of fear (Alashoor et al., 2017; Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Youn, 2005). Fear is 
an adverse sentiment on behalf of a response that ascends from diagnosing a threat (Boss et 
al., 2015). Fear takes different forms, including scare, stimulation, distress, and alarm. 
Similarly, fear is emotional tension, anxiety, nervousness, shock, provocation, apprehension, 
or uneasiness users feel when they are scared of future security threats that may cause them 
damage.  
     This research study derived that perceived severity positively impacted fear. Fear 
concerning perceived severity played an impactful part in PMT. The more fear users feel 
about a threat, the more severe the user believes the danger is (Milne et al., 2000). Prior 
research derived a similar positive relationship between perceived severity and fear 
(Arachchilage & Love, 2013; Boss et al., 2015; Liang & Xue, 2010). Therefore, the 
perceived severity envisaging fear matches the results of this research study (Boss et al., 
2015).  
     This research study derived that perceived vulnerability positively impacted fear (Boss et 
al., 2015; Chen & Zahedi, 2016). Fear concerning perceived vulnerability played a crucial 
role in PMT. Specifically, the more fear users feel of a threat; the more vulnerable users 
believe themself to be (Milne et al., 2000). Perceived vulnerability foreseeing fear matches 
this research study's outcomes (Arachchilage & Love, 2013; Boss et al., 2015). The influence 
of perceived severity on fear was more significant than that of perceived vulnerability in this 





Influences on Protection Motivation 
 
     This research study found that perceived severity positively impacted user’s protection 
motivation, unswerving with the empirical testing conducted in the prior literature (Chen & 
Zahedi, 2016). PMT's previous research found perceived severity to have a non-significant 
influence (Yang et al., 2017). In addition, this research study exhibited that perceived 
severity is vital for users' protection motivation to follow suggested security measures to 
avert social engineering breaches. Subsequently, this is reinforced by previous research in 
perceived severity applying PMT. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) posited the positive 
impact of perceived severity on protection motivation in research conducted in Australia. 
Similarly, Johnston et al. (2015) hypothesized a positive effect of perceived severity on 
protection motivation in a study in Finland. 
     This research study found a positive impact of perceived vulnerability on user’s protection 
motivation similar to former PMT evaluations (Alashoor et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017). This 
research study showed that perceived vulnerability is a vital influence on users' protection 
motivation to follow recommended security measures to prevent social engineering breaches. 
Earlier research in perceived vulnerability utilizing PMT supported this finding. Lee (2011) 
deliberated intention to adopt an antiplagiarism system and derived positive impact of 
perceived vulnerability employing PMT corroborating this research study. Similarly, 
Mohamed and Ahmad (2012) showed a positive influence of perceived vulnerability utilizing 
PMT by studying social networking sites in Malaysia. 
     This research study derived a positive impact of fear on users’ protection behavior 
analogous to prior PMT research (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). While most of the extant 





this research study incorporated fear appeal, considering it vital for PMT. This research study 
verified that the higher the fear, the more likely the user will be exhibiting protection 
motivation to follow recommended information security measures, thus substantiating the 
critical factor of fear appeal (Milne et al., 2000). Furthermore, Arachchilage and Love (2013) 
also posited a positive relationship between fear and protection motivation, corroborating this 
research study's discoveries. 
     This research study did not find a negative impact of maladaptive rewards on protection 
motivation, which corresponds to previous research (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). 
Preceding research leveraging PMT did not comprise the impact of maladaptive rewards in 
their research model (Alashoor et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2017). Marett et al. 
(2011) did not find any significant relationship between extrinsic rewards and the revelation 
of sensitive information. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) conducted an empirical 
investigation incorporating PMT in Australia and derived a non-significant influence of 
maladaptive rewards.  
     This research study highlighted a positive impact of response efficacy on protection 
motivation corresponding with previous research (Ifinedo, 2012; Lwin et al., 2012; Yang et 
al., 2017). However, some incidences of preceding research leveraging PMT did not 
comprise the impact of response efficacy in their research model (Alashoor et al., 2017). It 
was evident from this research study that response efficacy played an impactful role in 
protection motivation matching with former research (Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Crossler et al., 
2014; Meso et al., 2013). Boehmer et al. (2015) and Lee (2011) posited a positive impact of 
response efficacy confirming user's belief in the efficiency of the suggested security 





response efficacy positively impacted protection motivation, verifying findings from this 
research study. 
     It is apparent from this research study that the positive relationship between self-efficacy 
and protection motivation did not confirm, similar to preceding research (Alashoor et al., 
2017). There was evidence in the prior research of a positive relationship between self-
efficacy and protection motivation (Yang et al., 2017). Preceding research leveraging PMT 
did not comprise the impact of self-efficacy in their research model (Youn, 2005). The 
discovery of this research study conformed to the prior literature (Youn, 2009). 
     One of the thought-provoking findings of this research study was the dynamics between 
self-efficacy and response efficacy. Prior research studies frequently showed self-efficacy as 
a more critical factor than response efficacy in the information security arena (Crossler et al., 
2013). Conversely, this research study highlighted that response efficacy is more vital than 
self-efficacy. This research study also emphasized that response efficacy has the highest 
impact on protection motivation than any other construct in the research model. Response 
efficacy represents a user’s views of the effectiveness of recommended information security 
measures to prevent social engineering breaches. In comparison, self-efficacy represents a 
user’s confidence in their capacity to execute recommended information security measures. 
     Users must understand how recommended security measures secure an organization and 
how information security investments lead to a return. Even though some users understand 
the dangers and potential penalties of not following recommended information security 
measures, they are still not keen on following them. Frequently, users do not believe that 
their organization has comprehensive measures and controls to ensure the confidentiality, 





provides critical evidence helping organizations to improve protection behavior by carefully 
crafting a strategy to enhance users' response efficacy.  
     This research study did not find a negative relationship between response cost and 
protection motivation, similar to preceding research (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ng et al., 2009). 
Preceding research leveraging PMT did not encompass the influence of response cost 
(Alashoor et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2008; Youn, 2005). Ifinedo (2012) conducted a study in 
Canada and found a non-significant impact of response cost utilizing PMT. Crossler et al. 
(2014) instituted a non-significant impact of response cost employing PMT. Thus, response 
efficacy was the most critical impact on the coping appraisal for the protection motivation to 
prevent social engineering breaches found by this research study. 
Influences on Protection Behavior 
 
     This research study found a positive impact of protection motivation on protection 
behavior to prevent social engineering breaches like erstwhile PMT research (Posey et al., 
2015). The protection motivation to protection behavior hypothesis had the highest impact of 
any other hypothesis in this research model. It had emerged as the relationship with the 
highest path coefficient and t statistics value. Moreover, this indicates that users’ motivation 
to perform protection behaviors against social engineering threats is strongly associated with 
their actual performance of these behaviors. Conclusions from previous research, such as 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and Pahnila et al. (2007), contended that the protection 
motivation positively influenced the protection behavior to prevent the information security 
breach corroborating the discoveries from this research study. 
     This research study led to a positive relationship between the SETA program and 





against social engineering threats is layers of well-designed multi-dimensional SETA 
programs, helping users perceive and retort the attacks in the most appropriate way. The 
comprehensive SETA program defenses digital assets for the endurance and success of the 
organization and aims that every user turns out to be a portion of security solutions and not 
security problems (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015; Heartfield & Loukas, 2015). 
Subsequently, the SETA program provides a security-based foundation for users and 
positively influences users' protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches (Posey 
et al., 2015). 
     This research study did not find a positive relationship between security policies and 
protection motivation. Security policy in an organization outlines how to protect 
organizational digital assets from information security threats, including social engineering 
breaches (Moody et al., 2018). Chen et al. (2015) asserted that the SETA program positively 
impacts an organization's security policies; therefore, a better SETA program improves 
security policies. The SETA program and security policies improve users' protection 
behavior to follow information security measures to prevent social engineering breaches 
(Chen et al., 2015).  
Support for the Research Model 
 
     The research model utilized PLS-SEM because the investigation included verifying a 
theoretical framework from a prediction perspective. The t statistics value greater than equal 
to 1.96 with the two-tailed test at a 5% significance level indicates support of a hypothesis 
(Hair et al., 2017). Perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, and fear comprised threat 
appraisal and positively impacted the user’s protection motivation to follow recommended 





     Response efficacy covered coping appraisal and positively impacted protection 
motivation. Response efficacy had the highest impact on protection motivation than any 
other individual constructs. At the same time, hypotheses of maladaptive rewards, self-
efficacy, response cost, and security policies remained non-supported. The SETA program 
had a positive impact on the protection behavior. Moreover, protection motivation positively 
impacted the protection behavior with the highest t statistics value in the entire research 
model.  
Support for the Research Question 
 
     This research study addressed the following main research question: 
     RQ: What are the factors influencing the users’ information security protection behavior    
     towards social engineering breaches? 
     The discoveries and conclusions from this research study demonstrated factors 
influencing users' protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Overall, this 
research study assessed impacts of threat appraisal (perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, fear, and maladaptive rewards), coping appraisal (response efficacy, self-
efficacy, and response cost), protection motivation, SETA program, and security policies on 
users’ protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches.  
Limitations  
 
     There are some limitations related to this research study, like most academic research 
studies. First and foremost, participants of this research study were limited to those who had 
access to the computer or mobile, considering this research study involved an online survey. 
Assuming that this research study involved social engineering and information security, 
participants with access to the computer or mobile device made rational logic. Secondly, the 





should utilize a larger sample size considering the number of constructs utilized in this 
research study. 
     Finally, the participants who responded to this research study were limited to the U.S.A. 
Thus, the conclusions of this study may apply to one country only and may not be illustrative 
of all the countries and regions. The participants from one country may have also been less 
culturally diverse than the sample collected from multiple countries. 
Implications  
 
     The results of this research study have provided significant insinuations for theory and 
practice. 
Contributions to Theory 
 
     This research study makes a number of academic contributions in the realm of social 
engineering research. First and foremost, it provided valuable evidence of using PMT to 
understand the intricacies of social engineering. Social engineering attacks revolve around 
how users think, decide, behave, and respond. Once a social engineer has a comprehensive 
understanding of users’ behavior, it is easy to betray them. PMT provided a suitable 
framework for the users' protection motivation and protection behavior. There was a dearth 
of PMT theory-backed empirical investigation in the social engineering area. Henceforth, this 
research study enlarged PMT usage to a comparatively unutilized sphere of social 
engineering in the information security area. 
     Secondly, this research study examined the full nomology of the PMT model and not just 
the partial PMT model for the social engineering area. Much prior research applying PMT to 
information security did not incorporate the full nomology of the PMT model and did not 





reason, this research study exhibited that PMT full nomology utilization, including fear 
appeal, is necessary (Boss et al., 2015). 
     Thirdly, this research study incorporated the protection behavior in addition to protection 
motivation and thus posited that preventing social engineering breach goes beyond protection 
motivation, demonstrating the relevance of protection behavior. Previous research focused on 
users' protection motivation in various areas, including viruses, threats, unauthorized access, 
disruptions, attacks, malware, and spyware (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Mahmood, Siponen, Straub,  
Rao, & Raghu, 2010). However, prior research recommended that researching actual 
behavior is more vital than motivation (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Crossler et al., 2013). 
Incorporating protection behavior and motivation gave the complete picture of the high 
priority issue of social engineering breaches (Boss et al., 2015). 
     Finally, this research study combined the full nomology of the PMT model with the SETA 
program and security policies for the social engineering area. Social engineering fortification 
begins with the SETA program and security policies so that collective awareness progresses. 
The SETA program trains users to make clever security decisions and helps users exhibit 
specific behavior resulting in a diminution in social engineering breaches. By combining the 
SETA program and security policies into the traditional PMT model, this research study 
undertook significant aspects to bridge the gap of leveraging PMT in social engineering 
research and overall information security research. 
Contributions to Practice 
 
     Social engineering breaches have become so prevalent that organizations are in dire need 
of assistance to prevent an implausible amount of monetary loss. Social engineering has 





engineering is dangerous because it relies on user error and not technology error, as it is 
trickier to predict user error. Henceforth, users should be cognizant of social engineering, be 
accustomed to frequently used maneuvers, and know how to respond to them appropriately. 
This research study may help organizations build mechanisms that foster protection 
motivation to prevent compliance with information systems security policies and processes. 
A better understanding of users’ information security protection behavior to prevent social 
engineering breaches helps organizations formulate broader and better training programs, 
policies, and processes.   
     Organizations’ goal is to have users understand who and what to trust. Likewise, 
organizations must be on top of having a comprehensive SETA program and ensuring that 
the SETA program regularly encompasses emerging trends. Therefore, this research study 
has provided in-depth information about increasing users' protection behavior to prevent 
social engineering breaches. The findings of this research study may help information 




     All participants of this research study were from the U.S.A. This research study may 
produce variations in the results in other countries and regions of the world. Hence, the 
recommendations included conducting a replica of this research study in other areas of the 
world. A future research study should retest the questionnaire with samples from other 
countries to identify alterations across countries. Forthcoming studies should deliberate 





such criteria. Additionally, future research on this topic should employ a larger sample size 
because of the number of constructs used in this research study. 
Conclusion and Thesis Summary 
 
     Contemporary information security research has begun to focus more on human behavior 
in preventing security breaches than the traditional approach of technological angle. Social 
engineering entails manipulating users into disclosing confidential information or conducting 
actions to achieve illegal financial gains. Social engineering breaches have become so 
widespread that organizations and governments worldwide are facing severe unprecedented 
financial loss. The social engineering area has been deficient in theory-grounded empirical 
research. 
     This research study used the full nomology of PMT (Rogers, 1975) and social engineering 
literature to empirically inspect how threat appraisal, coping appraisal, SETA program, and 
security policies impact user's protection motivation and protection behavior to prevent social 
engineering breaches. Threat appraisal and coping appraisal both impact protection 
motivation. The threat appraisal evaluated the severity of the threat and scrutinized how 
severe the danger is. The coping appraisal demonstrated how users replied to the threat.  
     The research model was established based on the original research question and in-depth 
literature review. Data collection included web-based survey completion by one hundred 
twenty-nine participants from the U.S.A. Successful evaluation of the research model using 
PLS-SEM preceded with a practical Delphi study and data screening.  
     Protection motivation theory is a theory that initially elucidated fear appeals (Rogers, 
1975). All three hypotheses related to fear were supported, which is a significant contribution 





research study verified positive impacts of perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear, 
response efficacy, protection motivation, and the SETA program.     
     The conclusions of this research study have provided significant insinuations for research 
and practice. It demonstrated that PMT is a valued model for predicting users' protection 
behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. At the same time, one of the essential 
factors in information security research is to combine multiple angles to elucidate emerging 
phenomena and solve critical problems. This research study benefits organizations in 
transforming security posture from reactive to proactive by improving users’ behaviors. 
Overall, this research study has shown significant implications to the theory and practice in 
social engineering. Finally, this research study has propositioned insight into social 
















Summary of Measurement Items 





PS01 If I were to experience information security 
compromise due to social engineering breach, I would 
suffer much pain. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
PS02 If I were to experience information security 
compromise due to social engineering breach, it 





PS03 If I were to experience information security 
compromise due to social engineering breach, it 





PS04 If I were to lose data due to social engineering breach, 





PS05 Having my data destroyed by social engineering 
breach would be a serious problem for me. 
 




PV01 I am likely to experience information security 
compromise due to social engineering breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
PV02 My chances of losing sensitive data in the future are 
high due to social engineering breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
PV03 There is a chance that my personal information has 
been disclosed due to social engineering breach. 
 
Yoon et al., 
2012 
PV04 My data is likely to be undermined by malicious 
software such as viruses during social engineering 
breaches. 
 















FE01 I am worried about the experience of information 
security compromise due to social engineering 
breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
FE02 I am frightened about the experience of information 
security compromise due to social engineering 
breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
FE03 I am anxious about the experience of information 
security compromise due to social engineering 
breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
FE04 I am scared about the experience of information 
security compromise due to social engineering 
breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
FE05 My computer might become unusable as a result of 
information security compromise due to social 
engineering breaches. 
 




MR01 Not complying with information security measures to 
prevent social engineering breaches saves me time. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
MR02 Not complying with information security measures to 
prevent social engineering breaches saves me money. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
MR03 Not complying with information security measures to 
prevent social engineering breaches keeps me from 
being confused. 
 




Not complying with information security measures to 
prevent social engineering breaches would make it 
easier to use other programs on my computer. 
 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
MR05 Not complying with information security measures to 
prevent social engineering breaches would make it 
easier to use the functionality of my Internet browser. 
 









RE01 Complying with information security measures is a 
good way to reduce the risk of social engineering 
breaches. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
RE02 If I were to comply with information security 
measures, I would reduce my social engineering 
breach chances. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
RE03 Information security measure works for protection 





RE04 Information security measure is effective for 





RE05 When complying with information security measures, 








SE01 Information security measures to prevent social 





SE02 Information security measures to prevent social 







I am able to use Information security measures to 









I have the necessary skills to protect myself from 




















RC01 The cost of complying with information security 
measures to prevent social engineering breaches 
outweighs the benefits. 
 




I would be discouraged from complying with 
information security measures to prevent social 
engineering breaches because it would take too much 
time. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
RC03 Taking the time to comply with information security 
measures to prevent social engineering breaches 
would cause many problems. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
RC04 I would be discouraged from complying with 
information security measures to prevent social 
engineering breaches because I would feel silly doing 
so. 
 
Boss et al., 
2015 
RC05 The inconvenience of implementing recommended 
security measures to prevent social engineering 






ST01 My organization delivers training to help employees 







ST02 My organization educates employees on the 






ST03 My organization briefs employees on the 







My organization trains employees on their computer 









My organization educates employees on their 












SP01 My organization has prescribed rules and regulations 
to prevent information security compromise due to 





SP02 My organization's security policies prescribe my 






SP03 My organization has a formal policy that forbids 






SP04 My organization has a formal policy that forbids 






SP05 My organization has specific guidelines that describe 






PM01 I intend to comply with information security measures 
to prevent social engineering breaches during the next 
three months. 







I predict I will comply with information security 
measures to prevent social engineering breaches 






PM03 I plan to comply with information security measures 
to prevent social engineering breaches during the 





PM04 I will take precautions against information security 
violations during the next three months. 
 







I will not install unreliable software on my computer 
during the next three months. 
 











PB01  I intermittently check and remove viruses and 
malicious software.   
 
Yoon et al., 
2012 
PB02 I immediately remove suspicious e-mails without 
reading them. 
 
Yoon et al., 
2012 
PB03 Under no circumstances would I ever share anyone 
my ID, password, or any other credentials. 
 
Yoon et al., 
2012 
PB04 I ensure the execution of the latest tools and 
technologies on my devices per recommended 
information security measures. 
 
Liang & Xue, 
2010 
PB05 I do not proceed with any activity that I suspect can 
cause a social engineering breach (for example, using 











Summary of Reliability Evidence 




Boss et al., 2015 
 
.915 
Perceived Severity Johnston & Warkentin, 2010 .943 
Perceived Severity Yoon et al., 2012 .86 
Perceived Vulnerability Boss et al., 2015 .817 
Perceived Vulnerability Yoon et al., 2012 .83 
Perceived Vulnerability Workman et al., 2008 .854 
Fear Boss et al., 2015 .755 
Maladaptive Rewards Boss et al., 2015 .777 
Response Efficacy Boss et al., 2015 .898 
Response Efficacy Johnston & Warkentin, 2010 .897 
Self-efficacy Johnston & Warkentin, 2010 .942 
Self-efficacy Workman et al., 2008 .929 
Response Cost Boss et al., 2015 .845 
Response Cost Workman et al., 2008 .793 
SETA Program Al-Omari et al., 2012  .846 
Security Policies Al-Omari et al., 2012 .787 
Protection Motivation Boss et al., 2015 .984 
Protection Motivation Johnston & Warkentin, 2010 .954 
Protection Motivation Yoon et al., 2012 .85 
Protection Behavior  Yoon et al., 2012 .77 

















































































































Mahalanobis Distance and Stem & Leaf Plot 
Descriptives 
   Statistic Std. Error 
Mahalanobis Distance Mean 54.5736434 1.42793504 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
51.7482300   
Upper 
Bound 
57.3990569   
5% Trimmed Mean 53.2411465   
Median 51.9612901   
Variance 263.031   
Std. Deviation 16.21822444   
Minimum 23.44277   
Maximum 112.42643   
Range 88.98366   
Interquartile Range 16.04851   
Skewness 1.340 0.213 
Kurtosis 2.724 0.423 
 
Extreme Values 
   Case Number Value 
Mahalanobis Distance Highest 1 65 112.42643 
2 33 110.96614 
3 71 105.27385 
4   93 100.96868 
5 11 100.10160 
Lowest 1 48 23.44277 
2 9 28.15799 
3 101 30.28290 
4 72 30.52780 






Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Mahalanobis 
Distance 
0.109 129 0.001 0.903 129 0.000 














Mahalanobis Distance Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
  
Frequency     Stem &  Leaf 
  
1.00         2 .  3 
1.00         2 .  8 
7.00         3 .  0001234 
8.00        3 .  56778889 
16.00        4 .  0011111122234444 
24.00         4 .  555555566667777788888899 
16.00         5 .  0000111122334444 
20.00         5 .  55566677788888889999 
14.00         6 .  00000112233334 
8.00         6 .  56666888 
4.00         7 .  1124 
1.00         7 .  7 
2.00         8 .  02 
7.00  Extremes    (>=93) 
  
Stem width:   10.00000 

















Return of Mahalanobis Distance and Stem & Leaf Plot after removal of 5 extreme values 
Descriptives 
   Statistic Std. Error 
Mahalanobis Distance Mean 54.5564516 1.08812698 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
52.4025710   
Upper 
Bound 
56.7103323   
5% Trimmed Mean 54.1137729   
Median 53.8557106   
Variance 146.819   
Std. Deviation 12.11686929   
Minimum 30.64232   
Maximum 99.40180   
Range 68.75949   
Interquartile Range 15.97395   
Skewness 0.645 0.217 
Kurtosis 1.453 0.431 
 
Extreme Values 
   Case Number Value 
Mahalanobis Distance Highest 1 42 99.40180 
2 109 96.66706 
3 112 80.92948 
4 67 80.09708 
5 84 75.32278 
Lowest 1 96 30.64232 
2 9 30.67283 
3 68 33.60169 
4 28 33.64770 







Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Mahalanobis 
Distance 
0.052 124 .200* 0.968 124 0.005 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 














Mahalanobis Distance Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
  
Frequency     Stem &  Leaf 
  
5.00        3 .  00333 
7.00 3 .  5677789 
17.00         4 .  00000112222333344 
13.00         4 .  5666788999999 
22.00         5 .  0000000111111122233344 
20.00         5 .  55555667777778889999 
19.00         6 .  0000111122222233334 
11.00         6 .  55666677778 
5.00         7 .  01224 
1.00         7 .  5 
2.00         8 .  00 
2.00  Extremes    (>=97) 
  
Stem width:   10.00000 



















Normality and Scatter Plot 
Model Summaryb 






1 .814a 0.662 0.629 0.611722 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ST, RC, Case ID, SP, SE, PS, PV, MR, FE, RE, 
PM 






Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 82.064 11 7.460 19.937 .000b 
Residual 41.911 112 0.374     
Total 123.975 123       
a. Dependent Variable: PB 





























1 I am always watchful about my passwords. A weak or lost password is 
one of the biggest reasons for a security breach. I have seen people 
sharing the same password for multiple systems; or sharing the same 
password for their work accounts and personal accounts. Some people 
use a file on their computer to store all the passwords, which is a 
problem.  
2 I wish my organization had a robust training program to increase 
awareness among employees.  
3 My company runs phishing breach drills. Phishing is one of the most 
frquent types of social engineering. Phishing simulation tracks users 
who are clicking on the links, users who do nothing, and intelligent 
enough to report to the security group. It benefits us in testing how well 
employees are following security procedures. The employees who fail to 
respond as per the expectations are trained further.  
4 I try to keep myself up-to-date with the emerging trends. Awareness is 
the key here. The best way to combat any information security crimes is 
for companies to educate their employees to recognize social 
engineering tricks and techniques successfully. The content publication 
and education strategy should consider different approaches as different 
people consume information in different ways.  
5 I make sure that I have antivirus running on all my personal devices. 
Good antivirus software should be able to flag malicious messages and 
suspicious websites. It not only just protects from viruses but also spam 
and ads. It provides protection from removable devices like USBs.  
6 We all click on links that promise to give us something for free and look 
too good to be true.  Reputed organizations generally do not contact 
people directly to lure them.  
7 My company is now learning to focus on giving employees the 
knowledge and skills to spot security attacks. The biggest problem for 
an organization's data defense is its people. Many organizations do not 





8 I am a big proponent of cultivating a cyber-secure mindset. Social 
engineering is about finding out what makes people act without 
thinking. Social engineering causes 22% of all data breaches.  Do not let 
employees fall victim to the attackers.  
9 I feel that everyone should be interested and engaged in building 
security awareness in a company. It is about building a cyber-aware 
culture. Just one incident is enough for an attacker to compromise a 
company.  
10 I am cautious about these things: 1) How I use email 2) What links I 
click on 3) What websites I browse. 4) What Internet I use other than 
my home Internet. 5) Do not share confidential information. 6) Destroy 
important papers before disposing of them. 7) What files I download.  
No one is immune from security breaches, and hackers are moving at 
light speed. Criminals' sophistication level has increased, and they are 
using artificial intelligence and machine learning to build patterns and 
improve their tactics. Everything is a target, including credit cards, bank 
accounts, financial reports, user passwords, employee information, and 
intellectual properties.  
11 I experienced social engineering where an attacker impersonated my 
CFO and asked to do a wire transfer.  
12 I cross-check that online content is from trustworthy sources. If I receive 
content from external sources, I check that it is safe to consume.  
13 I feel that it is a good idea to check everything every time.  It is like 
having a strategy to trust no one.  
14 My company is a small startup, and we do not have a single full-time 
employee staffed to manage security issues.  
15 I am mindful of the process of employees' authority to wire payments 
and do electronic fund transfers. I demand extra scrutiny of international 
wires.  
16 I do not open attachments from unidentified sources.  
17 We experienced an attack where we lost control over all the servers and 
all my organization's applications. It was dangerous and took us several 
days to be back to normal. We overhauled our security program after 





18 I watch out for suspicious emails. I have observed spelling and grammar 
mistakes in phishing emails. On the contrary, I have also seen perfect 
emails without any mistakes. I have noticed that phishing emails often 
demand urgent actions.  
19 I believe that every organization's biggest problem is cybercrime. In 
large organizations, not everyone knows everyone. Hackers spend much 
of their time before the attack researching, and they are looking to take 
advantage of the employees who are eager to help. I help employees 
realize and visualize how information can be exploited.  
20 I think it is vital to stop emails that cause information security attacks. 
All email systems provide spam filter functionality. I set the spam filter 
option to high to keep the suspicious emails out of access. I balance it by 
checking the spam folder so that spam folders do not have genuine 
emails. I get many emails that are spam.  
21 I have seen people getting calls from hackers pretending to be a Help 
Desk person from their company. I am continually alert with all 
incoming calls to ensure that they are from a trusted source.  
22 Never reveal passwords.  
23 In general, breaches happen due to either technical problems or user 
problems. Cyberattacks are mainly network-based or social-based. 
Network attacks involve acquiring unauthorized access through 
applications or infrastructure. Social attacks involve social engineering 
to tricking people into gaining unauthorized access to information. I 
have learned from my experience where someone contacted me posing 
as my antivirus software company account representative.  
24 I have engaged with an external vendor who provides cybersecurity 
solutions to my small business.  
25 As a Global CISO, the best advice I can give is to make information 
security training a regular activity.  
26 Our executive leadership understands the value and supports the 
program. Our program is checked with the auditors and regulators to 
assess if we are doing the right thing.  
27 My company did a security campaign. However, it was "one and done". 
A one-time program is not good enough for the employees to 





28 Be careful with everything in today's time. If someone offers a free 
iPhone, then be suspicious.  No one is going to provide a free iPhone to 
an unknown person without any reason.    
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